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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)0'). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Although Appellant sets forth three issues in its statement of issues, these 
questions are redundant and this appeal actually presents only one question for this 
Court's decision: 
Did the district court commit reversible error in granting 
summary judgment based on the equitable excuse doctrine? 
This Court reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment for correctness and 
"may affirm a summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if not 
relied on below." Straub v. Fisher & Pavkel Health Care. 1999 UT 102, f 6, 990 P.2d 
384, 386 (Utah 1999). Also, Appellant challenges a grant of equitable relief; "courts 
have broad authority to grant equitable relief as needed." Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 
1243 (Utah 1998). Accordingly, this Court "will disturb the trial court's judgment only 
where necessary to prevent manifest injustice." Mackay v. Hardy. 896 P.2d 626, 629 
(Utah 1995). See also Penrose v. Penrose. 656 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1982); Jackson v. 
Jackson. 617 P.2d 338, 340 (Utah 1980). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations are 
determinative of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Statement of Facts 
This is an appeal from a decision of the district court granting summary judgment 
in favor of Appellee Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited dba White Pine Touring ("White 
Pine"). The district court equitably excused White Pine from strictly complying with the 
notice provisions of a lease option, and upheld its exercise of an option to extend its 
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commercial lease agreement (the "Lease") with Appellant Utah Coal and Lumber 
Restaurant, Inc. ("UC&L") for the Utah Coal and Lumber Building (the "Building") in 
Park City. Because the district court's decision was based upon an evaluation of the 
equities between the parties as they pertained to the exercise of the lease option, and 
UC&L has attacked the district court's decision on the merits, this Statement of the Facts 
will set out the undisputed facts at length so that this court can properly review the 
district court's action. The following are undisputed facts presented to the district court: 
1. Background and Events Preceding Negotiation of the Lease 
The owners of White Pine, Charlie and Kathy Sturgis, have been in the sporting 
goods business in Park City since 1986. White Pine employs about 44 people. (R. 77-78, 
574-575). For seven years, until August 1993, White Pine leased a location on Main 
Street in Park City. During its last year at this location, White Pine paid annual rent 
amounting to $39,179. (R. 299-314, 572-574, 599, 708). 
UC&L has owned the Building and surrounding property since about 1976. (R. 
20, 555). For several years prior to May 1993, Nicholas Powell, UC&L's president, was 
the lessee of the Building and operated a restaurant there. In 1991, Mr. Powell paid 
UC&L rent of approximately $15,000, and in 1992, Mr. Powell paid UC&L 
approximately $19,000 in rent. (R. 288-289, 552-554, 556-559, 599, 708). 
In 1993, before White Pine's renovations, the Building was in a state of serious 
disrepair. The entire lower floor was completely unusable except for storage. (R. 543-
544? 570-571). For approximately six months before May 16, 1993, UC&L had 
unsuccessfully attempted to lease the Building. (R. 538, 545-546, 550-551, 599). 
Knowing it would be required to spend a considerable sum to remodel the Building, 
White Pine insisted on and ultimately obtained a long-term lease. (R. 594, R. 706). 
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2. The 1993 Lease 
On May 16, 1993, White Pine signed the Lease, a copy of which is attached as 
Appendix A. White Pine leased the Building for a total of twenty years, consisting of an 
initial five-year term, with the option to extend for three additional five-year terms. For 
the first two years, the annual rent under the Lease was $33,000. During the subsequent 
three year period, the annual rent was increased to $50,500. For each subsequent five-
year extension, rent under the Lease increases based on the Consumer Price Index. (R. 
493-508, 532, 599, 707). 
Under the Lease, White Pine received, for the first two years, a slight decrease in 
the rent it had paid to its previous lessor, while UC&L received a substantial increase in 
the rent it previously received from Mr. Powell. White Pine's initial rent under the Lease 
was only $6,179 less than the rent it was paying at 363 Main Street. In contrast, White 
Pine's initial rental rate under the Lease was $14,000 more than the rent previously paid 
by Nicholas Powell for the Building. (R. 599, 708). 
3. White Pine's Restoration of the UC&L Building 
When they entered the Lease, the parties understood that, due to the Building's 
dilapidated condition, substantial remodeling would be necessary to make the premises 
safe and attractive for retail use. (R. 597, 599, R. 707, 708). White Pine was willing to 
make this investment because it believed that it would be in the Building for the full 20 
year term of the Lease. White Pine could only recoup the value of this investment if it 
had the ability to depreciate it over that time. (R. 594, 706). 
White Pine began renovating the Building immediately after the Lease was signed. 
After the work began, White Pine's architect and structural engineer unexpectedly 
advised White Pine that mere remodeling would not do, and that the Building had serious 
structural problems that would require a significant additional investment to make the 
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Building safe and to comply with applicable building codes. (R. 484-492, 597, 707).] 
According to the Sturgises' structural engineer, the resolution of these and other 
problems was necessary to make the Building safe for commercial purposes. (R. 279-
281, 484-492, 519-521, 541-543, 596, 707). 
Between May and October 1993, White Pine incurred over $148,000 in expenses 
to renovate and relocate its business to the Building. (R. 260-261, 292-298, 596, 707). 
White Pine spent a significant portion of its total expenditures—over $105,000 of the 
$148,000—for permanent improvements to the Building, including: 
(a) Tearing down existing interior structures and fixtures; 
(b) Replacing the Building's wiring; 
(c) Replacing virtually all of the plumbing in the Building; 
(d) Replacing structural components, as outlined above; 
(e) Shoring up the badly deteriorated porch; 
(f) Building out the entire lower floor for public use; 
(g) Designing and installing public bathrooms; 
Specifically, the structural engineer discovered the following: 
(a) The roof, floor, and wall systems had insufficient lateral strength to resist 
earthquake or wind; 
(b) The roof was under-designed, and no insulation could be added to the attic 
without risking the roofs collapse; 
(c) Roof truss members had been cut to allow for installation of a duct, resulting 
in weakened roof members; 
(d) Floor joists were cracked and in need of repair; 
(e) The main center floor beam had been notched and was in need of repair; 
(f) Floor joists lacked blocking at bearing points and required repair; 
(g) Supporting posts in the basement had dry rot and needed to be replaced; 
(h) The beam support at the Building's west end was structurally insufficient and 
needed repair; and 
(i) The concrete retaining wall surrounding the building had cracks that needed 
repair. 
(R. 484-492, 597, 707). 
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(h) Redesigning and constructing new doors and windows; 
(i) Eliminating pests from the premises; 
(j) One-half the cost of designing and installing a new 
heating system; 
(k) One-half the cost of installing a new sidewalk; 
(1) Architectural, structural engineering, and permitting 
fees; and 
(m) Other costs necessary to bring the building into 
compliance with applicable building and zoning codes. 
(R. 261-263, 292-298, 522-526, 596-595, 707). In stark contrast to the $105,000 paid by 
White Pine for permanent improvements (and the $43,000 for relocating, trade fixtures, 
and other expenses), UC&L spent only $9,068.70 on the 1993 improvements to the 
Building. 
4. Commercial Expectations Under the Lease 
From the beginning, both UC&L and White Pine assumed that White Pine would 
take all three five-year extensions under the Lease, and occupy the Building for the full 
twenty years. Indeed, to recover their $148,000 investment in the Building, the Sturgises 
thought that White Pine would have to occupy the Building for the full 20 years under the 
Lease. UC&L—which admits that White Pine's expenditures significantly increased the 
Building's value—knew of White Pine's financial need to occupy the Building for the 
full 20 years. (R. 73-75, 253-254, 278, 547-548, 535, 594, 706). Nicholas Powell 
testified that, in 1997 and early 1998, he expected White Pine to remain in the building 
for 20 years and "would have been shocked" if White Pine did not extend the Lease 
beyond its initial five-year term. (R. 250-254, 275, 278, 515-516, 543, 594, 706). In 
1997, UC&L's president commissioned an appraisal of the Building and surrounding 
property. The valuation in this appraisal was based on the assumption that White Pine 
2
 UC&L also spent $20,635.41 for a fire sprinkler system that, under local codes, UC&L 
was obligated to install regardless of White Pine's occupancy. (R. 595, 706-707) 
159180 5 
would occupy the Building for the full twenty-year period. (R. 320-483, 517-518, 594, 
706). In addition, in March 1998, just before the option period opened, Charlie Sturgis 
had a conversation with Mr. Powell during which they discussed White Pine's continued 
occupancy. Mr. Powell testified that, at the conclusion of that conversation, he 
understood that White Pine intended to exercise the option to extend. (R. 516). From 
1993 to the present, White Pine has been a model tenant - it always paid its rent on time, 
and, except for minor problems that were quickly cured, never violated any provision of 
the Lease. (R. 277-278, 527, 594, 706). 
5. Delayed Notice of Intent to Renew the Lease 
UC&L's lawyer drafted the Lease. (R. 287, 528-529, 533, 536-537, 549, 598, 
707). The following lease renewal provision appears on the Lease's first page: 
The Premises are leased to Tenant for the primary term of 
five (5) years beginning on July 1, 1993, provided that, if the 
necessary approvals for occupancy are not obtained from 
Park City prior to that date, the primary term shall commence 
on the earlier of the date occupancy is permitted by Park City 
or October 1, 1993 (the "commencement date"'! and ending 
on the same date in the year 1998. . . . Tenant shall have the 
right to extend the term of the lease for three (3) separate and 
additional consecutive periods of five (5) years each, which 
right shall be exercised by Tenant providing Landlord with 
written notice thereof not more than one hundred twenty 
(120) nor less than sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of 
the term or any extended term. Each such extended term 
shall be on the same terms and conditions as set forth herein, 
except that rent shall be adjusted as hereinafter provided. 
(R. 493-508, 532, 598, 707)(emphasis added). 
It is noteworthy that while this lease provision requires the tenant was to give 
written notice to the landlord of an intention to renew not more than 120 nor less than 60 
days before the expiration of the Lease's primary term, the expiration date is not 
explicitly set out in the Lease. Rather, it is determinable in this case by reference to the 
date upon which Park City had issued approvals for occupancy of the premises. 
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Although Park City issued an occupancy permit for the Building on September 9, 
1993, neither White Pine nor UC&L, was aware of the issuance of the permit at the time. 
UC&L saw the occupancy permit for the first time in May 1998, when Nicholas Powell 
obtained a copy from Park City to determine when the notice was due. Mr. Powell, 
however, did not did not pass this information on to the Sturgises until after White Pine's 
notice of renewal period had expired. (R. 282-286, 529-532, 597, 707). 
Assuming Park City issued a certificate of occupancy on September 9,1993, the 
notice period for White Pine's extension of the Lease began on May 13, 1998, and 
expired on July 11, 1998. (R. 493-508, 530-532, 593, 706). White Pine gave written 
notice of its intent to extend 11 days after the July 11, 1998 deadline. On July L>, 
1998—four days after the notice period expired—UC&L's attorney sent White Pine a 
letter stating that the Lease would expire on September 9, 1998, and that White Pine 
should plan to vacate the Building. (R. 318-319, 513-514, 592, 706), Because this letter 
was incorrectly addressed, White Pine did not receive it until July 22, 1998. (R. 257). 
Within hours of receiving the letter, White Pine had consulted with an attorney, and had 
its attorney provide written notice of White Pine's intent to extend the Lease. (R. 257, 
276, 315-317, 512-513, 592, 706). 
Regarding White Pine's failure to give notice, Kathy Sturgis explained that "I 
honestly missed this . . . . I like to pride myself on being fairly detail oriented, but I 
missed it." (R. 255, 267-271, 566-567, 593, 706). White Pine's former attorney had 
advised the Sturgises that the 30-day default clause m fir Lease would cover any notice 
problem, including any notice related to the extension. The Sturgises believed, 
erroneously it turned out, that this default clause would cover any notice of term 
extensions under the Lease. (R. 256-257, 265-266, 563-565, 568-569, 593, 706). Ms. 
Sturgis further explained that, during the option period, White Pine was in the middle of 
intense negotiations with Park City over the future of White Pine's cross-country skiing 
concession, which represented a substantial part of its business. The Sturgises were also 
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coping with the unexpected loss of a critical employee, with a restructuring of White 
Pine's management, and with a variety of family issues. (R. 255, 267-271, 566-567, 593, 
706). 
When UC&L sought to terminate the Lease based on White Pine's 11-day delay in 
providing written notice, White Pine had been in the Building for only five years—a 
timeframe within which none of the parties expected White Pine to recoup its $148,000 
investment in the Building. (R. 250-254, 275, 278, 515-516, 543, 594, 706). 
B. Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the Court Below 
On September 17, 1998, UC&L filed an unlawful detainer action against White 
Pine in the Third District Court for Summit County, Utah. (R. 1-20). On October 8, 
1998, White Pine answered UC&L's complaint and filed a counterclaim seeking, inter 
alia, a declaratory judgment that White Pine was equitably excused from strict 
compliance with the notice of extension provision of the Lease. (R. 44-83). Over the 
next several months, the parties engaged in written and oral discovery. 
On March 16, 1999, UC&L filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking 
judgment on its unlawful detainer claim. (R. 150-246). On March 30,1999, White Pine 
filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment, seeking an order that White Pine was 
equitably excused from strict compliance with the Lease's notice provision. (R. 247-
603). White Pine submitted a detailed statement of undisputed facts. (R. 590-600). 
UC&L, in response, did not raise any disputed issues of material fact. (R. 706-708)/ On 
July 26, 1999, the district court held a hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary 
judgment. 
3
 UC&L either expressly admitted the individual facts or responded by stating they were 
"disputed to the extent that the facts alleged have not been established and are merely 
allegations by White Pine without support." This response fails to comply with the 
requirements of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) and, as a result, UC&L has admitted 
those facts for purposes of this case. See Utah Code Jud. Admin. 4-501(2)(B). 
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On August 6, 1999, the district court entered an order granting partial summary 
judgment to White Pine. (R. 741-746). A copy of the district court's August 6, 1999 
order is attached as Appendix B. In the judgment, the district court stated that Utah law 
generally requires strict compliance with notice requirements relating to the lessee's 
option to extend a Lease, but that the equitable excuse doctrine is available under Utah 
law as an exception to that rule. (R. 745). The court noted that a tenant's mere mistake 
or forgetfulness is insufficient, by itself, to satisfy the requirements of the equitable 
excuse doctrine and that a landlord is not responsible for a tenant's forgetfulness. (R. 
745). 
The district court held that, "[b]ased upon the undisputed facts of this case, White 
Pine has met the requirements necessary to invoke the doctrine of equitable excuse." (R. 
744). On the basis of undisputed evidence, the court concluded that White Pine's 11-day 
delay in exercising its option to extend was slight, and that UC&L did not suffer any 
harm or prejudice due to White Pine's delay. (R. 744). The court noted that UC&L did 
not change its position in reliance on White Pine's delay, and therefore would suffer no 
injury if White Pine was equitably excused from its 11 day delay in providing written 
notice. (R. 744). 
In contrast, the court found that White Pine would suffer substantial and 
irreparable harm if its delay was not equitably excused. (R. 744). Specifically, the court 
noted that White Pine invested a significant amount of money for permanent 
improvements to the 15 ml ding, with the expectation that it would remain in the Building 
for the Lease's full 20-year extended term. (R. 744). The court concluded: 
The loss of White Pine's monetary investment, its expectation 
that it would remain at that location for 20 years, and the loss 
of good will associated with operating its business at that 
location all factor into the harm that White Pine would suffer 
if its delay in exercising the option to extend is not equitably 
excused. 
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(R. 744). The district court further concluded that White Pine's delay in extending the 
Lease was not due to willful conduct or gross negligence. (R. 745). Rather, the court 
found, White Pine's mistake was honest and justifiable under the circumstances. (R. 
745). 
Accordingly, the district court dismissed UC&L's unlawful detainer complaint and 
entered partial summary judgment granting White Pine the relief sought. (R. 744). 
Specifically, the court declared that White Pine was equitably excused from strictly 
complying with the terms of the Lease relating to time for giving written notice of an 
intent to extend the Lease's primary term. (R. 743). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Although Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998), held that lease renewal 
provisions must generally be strictly enforced according to their terms, the Geisdorf court 
explicitly recognized that, in certain circumstances, the lessee may be excused from 
compliance. Although Geisdorf rejected the doctrines of "substantial compliance" and 
waiver advanced by the lessee in that case, it stated that "there are instances in which 
deviation from strict compliance may be equitably excused.'' One such instance, 
according to the Court, arises "when the optionee's conduct in failing to comply was not 
due to willful or gross negligence on the part of the optionee but was rather the result of 
our honest and justifiable mistake." Geisdorf v. Dougherty. 972 P.2d at 71. 
Geisdorf s recognition of the doctrine of equitable excuse is consistent with the 
rule established in the vast majority of jurisdictions to have considered the question 
throughout the nation. These courts have held that, as a narrow exception to the general 
rule of strict compliance with Lease renewal provisions, the doctrine of equitable excuse 
applies where, as here, the equities strongly favor the lessee. To invoke the doctrine of 
equitable excuse as it has developed throughout the nation the tenant must meet three 
requirements, each of which was met in this case, according to undisputed facts. 
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First, the tenant must prove that it will suffer a grave hardship if the lease's 
renewal provisions are strictly enforced. In this case, as in many cases in which courts 
have excused strict compliance, the tenant presented unrebutted proof that it will suffer 
irreparable harm if not excused. White Pine proved, and the district court held, that 
White Pine will forfeit nearly $150,000 in expenditures, most of which were made to 
purchase permanent improvements to the leasehold. White Pine will lose the value of 
these improvements (all of which were made on the assumption that the Lease would 
continue for 20 years) and UC&L will receive a corresponding windfall. 
Second, the tenant must prove that the landlord will suffer no prejudice as the 
result of the delayed notification of the tenant's extension. In this case, White Pine 
presented unrebutted proof that its brief delay in giving notice—the delay amounted to 
eleven days—caused no prejudice whatsoever to UC&L. 
Third, the tenant must show that its delay in giving notice was relatively brief and 
the result of an innocent mistake, as opposed to willfulness or gross negligence. In this 
case, White Pine showed—again on the basis of undisputed facts—that its delay was 
truly brief in relation to the term of the Lease and was the result of a simple mistake, with 
no intent to deceive or obtain advantage. On this point, UC&L misstates the law of 
equitable excuse in arguing that the delay must be shown to have been the result of the 
landlord's misconduct. None of the cases adopting the doctrine of equitable excuse 
requires such a showing. 
Finally, contrary to UC&L's arguments, the facts supporting the district court's 
judgment were all undisputed. Having failed to raise any issues of disputed facts before 
the district court, UC&L may not attempt to do so before this Court. 
White Pine complied, as a matter of law, with all of the requirements on the basis 
of which courts have invoked the doctrine of equitable excuse in cases similar to this one. 
As a result, White Pine asks the Court to affirm the district court's judgment. But if the 
Court disagrees and determines to revise the doctrine, White Pine asks the Court to 
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remand the case for further proceedings and, if necessary, a trial on the merits, so that 
White Pine may present evidence in conformity with any new rule announced by the 
Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE EXCUSE IS A NARROW BUT WELL 
RECOGNIZED EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE OF STRICT 
COMPLIANCE 
A* Utah cases have acknowledged the doctrine's existence 
The general rule in Utah is that lease renewal options must be exercised in strict 
accordance with the option's terms. See, e.g.. Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d at 70-71; 
Upland Indus. Corp. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co.. 684 P.2d 638, 640 (Utah 1984). 
UC&L emphasizes this point in its opening brief. However, it glosses over the fact that 
Utah also recognized the existence of an equitable excuse doctrine which is an exception 
to that rule. As this Court stated in Geisdorf. the general rule of "[s]trict compliance is 
not arcane ritualism at work." 972 P.2d 67, 71 (Utah 1998). "Indeed, there are instances 
in which deviation from strict compliance may be equitably excused." IcL (emphasis 
added). 
Geisdorf is not the first recognition of the principles underlying the equitable 
excuse doctrine in Utah. Some 90 years ago this Court noted that courts may "disregard 
any provisions of a contract, or save rights that are lost thereunder through the act of the 
party asking relief [if] it is made to appear that it would be unconscionable or clearly 
inequitable to do or not to do so." I.X.L. Furniture & Carpet Installment House v. Berets. 
32 Utah 454, 91 P. 279, 282 (Utah 1907). UC&L asserts that because the I.X.L. Court 
did not find that the facts of the case before it warranted the application of an equitable 
exception, it was really rejecting the doctrine's availability in Utah. This is a flat 
misreading of that decision. The court said nothing suggesting that the doctrine was not 
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viable in Utah.4 By the same reasoning, UC&L reads Geisdorf as rejecting the doctrine 
because it was not applied to the facts of that case. The unsoundness of that argument is 
obvious. 
Although Geisdorf did not turn on an application of the equitable excuse doctrine, 
and this Court accordingly had no occasion to discuss it in depth, the Geisdorf opinion 
does note some of the circumstances where equity may permit deviation from strict 
compliance appropriate. These could include substantial compliance in the face of 
"'exigent circumstances beyond [the parties'] control'"; circumstances where "some act 
of the optionor such as waiver or misleading representations or conduct'" prevents strict 
compliance; and "when the optionee's 'conduct in failing to comply was not due to 
willful or gross negligence on the part of the optionee but was rather the result of an 
honest and justifiable mistake.'" Geisdorf, 972 P.2d at 71(citations omitted).5 Geisdorf 
4
 Aside from the fact that I.X.L. did not reject equitable excuse, UC&L's position lacks 
merit for two reasons. First, I.X.L. is distinguishable from this case. The tenant in I.X.L. 
made improvements to the leased premises that were minimal at best and, 
correspondingly, the court found that the tenant "lost nothing but an opportunity" to 
continue under the lease, rather than the value of improvements. IdL at 279, 283. Also, 
the tenant sought equitable relief based on "mere inadvertence," rather than hardship to 
the tenant, lack of hardship to the landlord, in conjunction with inadvertence. Second, the 
I.X.L. opinion was issued in 1907, decades before most of the jurisprudence regarding 
the equitable excuse doctrine was developed. By 1998, the principle that "there are 
instances in which deviation from strict compliance may be equitably excused" was well-
established, as this Court noted in Geisdorf. 972 P.2d at 71. 
5
 The Geisdorf court cited Cattle Feeders. Inc. v. Jordan, 549 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1977), for the general proposition that a tenant may be entitled to equitable relief if its 
failure to timely comply was the result of an "honest and justifiable mistake." See 
Geisdorf. 972 P.2d at 71. As in Geisdorf. the Cattle Feeders court recognized that, in 
certain instances, equity will excuse a tenant's failure to timely comply with a lease 
renewal provision, but had no occasion to apply this principle. See 549 S.W.2d at 33. 
Unlike White Pine, the tenant in Cattle Feeders "simply never notified the [lessor] of its 
intention to exercise the option." IdL UC&L fixates on the fact that Cattle Feeders 
recognized the equitable excuse doctrine in dicta, and continues to ignore the fact that 
virtually all courts that have had occasion to address the issue in recent years have 
recognized and applied the equitable excuse doctrine. See William B. Johnston, 
Annotation, Circumstances Excusing Lessee's Failure to Give Timely Notice of Exercise 
of Option to Renew or Extend Lease. 27 ALR4th 267, 270 (1997). 
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obviously does not address in detail the scope or limits of the equitable excuse doctrine. 
But it nevertheless recognized the equitable exception, and the fact that its application 
requires a balancing of the equities presented in each case. IdL 
UC&L makes a superficial argument that this case is identical to Geisdorf. UC&L 
is wrong, and Geisdorf is distinguishable, for several reasons. First, the only issues 
directly before the Court were whether substantial compliance, rather than strict 
compliance, was the appropriate standard for exercising options to renew, and whether 
the doctrine of waiver could apply under to the facts of the case. Geisdorf, 972 P.2d at 
70-72. Neither of these issues is before the Court in this case.6 Second, the tenant in 
Geisdorf did not argue on appeal, or apparently to the district court, that he should be 
equitably excused from strict compliance. Id at 69. Third, the tenant in Geisdorf did not 
have a factual basis for arguing equitable excuse. The opinion contains no evidence that 
he spent money making permanent improvements to the leasehold estate, or that his 
failure to provide timely notice was a mistake. In addition, the tenant's notice was almost 
two months late. Id at 68. In short, the Court did not have directly before it, and 
therefore did not decide, the exact parameters of the doctrine and how it should be 
applied. The parties did not argue it, and the facts would not support it. Significantly, 
however, the Court saw fit, in the context of reiterating its long-standing rule requiring 
strict compliance, to note that these equitable exceptions are available, in an appropriate 
case. This is just such a case. 
B. There is Broad Judicial Recognition of the Equitable Excuse Exception to 
Strict Compliance 
The Utah Supreme Court is far from alone in recognizing the equitable excuse 
doctrine as an exception to strict compliance. According to one recent annotation, "it 
6
 In Geisdorf, the tenant's only arguments on appeal were that he substantially complied 
with the option at issue, and also that the landlord waived strict compliance. Geisdorf 
972 P.2d at 69-70 
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appears that all courts which have dealt with the issue in recent years have recognized 
that there can be special circumstances which may warrant equitable relief from a 
lessee's failure or delay in giving notice of an option in its lease." William B. Johnston, 
Annotation, Circumstances Excusing Lessee's Failure to Give Timely Notice of Exercise 
of Option to Renew or Extend Lease. 27 ALR4th 267, 270 (1997). One of the leading 
commentators on contracts states: "If, in expectation of exercising the power, the lessee 
has made valuable improvements, and the delay is short without any change of position 
by the lessor, the lessee will be given specific performance of the contract to sell or to 
renew." 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 35, at 146-47. Other courts have noted its 
broad acceptance. In Duncan v. G.E.W.. Inc.. 526 A.2d 1358, 1363-64 (D.C. App. 1987), 
the court stated that "'[i]t is rather generally considered within the province of equity to . 
. . allow renewal despite slight, relatively inconsequential and excusable tardiness.'" 
(citation omitted). And in Corim. Inc. v. Sam Blair Co.. Inc.. 721 S.W.2d 256, 260 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1986), the court noted that that the equitable excuse doctrine is "'is quite 
generally recognized'" (citation omitted). Under this doctrine, such courts reject "hyper 
technical legal arguments . . . relied upon to prevent fair and just results" and recognize 
that "by enforcing a series of options that everyone expected to be exercised, [the court] 
is in fact promoting the real commercial expectations of the parties." Duncan. 526 A.2d 
at 1365.7 
The following courts have recognized and applied the doctrine of equitable 
excuse to relieve a tenant of strictly complying with an option to renew or extend the 
term of a lease. See e ^ Aickin v. Ocean View Inv. Co.. 935 P.2d 992, 1001 (Hawaii 
1997) (finding equity applied because lessor had not altered its position); Fleming Cos. v. 
Equitable Life Ins.. 818 P.2d 813, 818 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (finding no evidence of 
willfully negligent conduct); Duncan v. G.E.W.. Inc.. 526 A.2d 1358, 1363 (D.C. App. 
1987) (finding equity may "intervene if circumstances are compelling"); Inn of Hills. Ltd. 
v. Schulgen & Kaiser. 723 S.W.2d 299, 300-01 (Tex. App. 1987) (extending lease where 
delay was only slight); Niagara Frontier Services. Inc. v. Thress. 487 N.Y.S.2d 228, 229 
(App.Div. 1985) (stating "where a tenant has negligently or inadvertently failed to give 
notice, but has made improvements of such nature that he would sustain a substantial loss 
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if the lease were not renewed, equity will intervene to prevent a forfeiture if the landlord 
has not materially changed his position to his prejudice in reliance on the tenant's failure 
to exercise the option."); Linn v. LaSalle National Bank, 424 N.E.2d 676, 679 (111. 1981) 
(applying doctrine because tenant had made substantial improvements); Ward v. 
Washington Distributors, Inc.. 425 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (finding 
equitable relief could be granted where there was an honest mistake and lessor suffered 
no harm); Trollen v. City of Wabasha, 287 N.W.2d 645, 647 (Minn. 1979) (extending 
lease where there was only inconsequential tardiness and lessee had made 
improvements); Wharf Restaurant Inc. v. Port of Seattle. 605 P.2d 334, 341 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1979) (applying doctrine as failure to give notice was inadvertent and forfeiture 
would result); Fletcher v. Frisbee, 404 A.2d 1106, 1108 (N H. 1979) ("[Ejquity will give 
relief to a lessee who has failed to exercise the option within the required time, if the 
delay is slight, the delay has not prejudiced the landlord, and the failure to grant relief 
would result in such hardship to the tenant as to make literal enforcement of the renewal 
provision unconscionable."); Sosanie v. Pernetti Holding Co.. 115 NJ. Super. 409, 416 
(N.J. Super. 1971) (applying doctrine where plaintiffs "failure to give timely notice was 
based upon an honest mistake of fact in that they had forgotten the date of the 
deadline."); Dugan v. Haige. 54 So. 2d 201, 202 (Fla. 1951) (extending lease where 
lessor was neither harmed nor damaged); F.B. Fountain Co. v. Stein. 118 A. 47, 56 
(Conn. 1922) ("But in case of mere neglect in fulfilling a condition precedent of a lease, 
which does not fall within accident or mistake, equity will relieve when the delay has 
been slight, the loss to the lessor small, and when not to grant relief would result in such 
hardship to the tenant as to make it unconscionable to enforce literally the condition 
precedent of the lease."); Monihon v. Wakelin. 56 P. 735, 736 (Ariz. 1899) (finding 
equity warranted enforcing option contract where landlord did not lease building to new 
tenant and was not hurt by delay); Car-X Service Systems. Inc. v. Heller. 927 F.2d 511, 
516-17 (10th Cir. 1991) (granting summary judgment to tenant and equitably excusing 
delay in providing notice to extend) (applying Kansas law). In addition, the following 
courts have either expressly or implicitly acknowledged the existence of the doctrine, but 
have yet to find appropriate circumstances that would warrant its application. See e.g. 
Gardner v. HKT Realty Corp.. 744 S.W.2d 735, 738 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988) 
(acknowledging factors such as length of delay, construction of improvements, and 
financial burden on parties); 33 Flavors Stores. Inc. v. Hoffman's Candies. Inc.. 370 
S.E.2d 293, 295 (S.C. 1988) (finding no circumstances present that would justify excuse); 
Trueman-Aspen Co. v. North Mill Inv. Corp.. 728 P.2d 343, 344 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) 
(denying equitable relief as tenant would not lose the value of its investments and 
improvements); Corim. Inc. v. Sam Blair Co.. Inc.. 721 S.W.2d 256, 260 (Tenn.Ct. App. 
1986) (acknowledging equity will intervene if delay is slight, delay did not prejudice 
landlord, and failure to grant relief would cause unconscionable hardship); Greenhill Inv. 
Co. v. Tabet. 1986 Del. Ch. LEXIS 480, *20 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 1986) (finding 
circumstances did not warrant excuse); Simons v. Young. 155 Cal. Rptr. 460, 470 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1979) (acknowledging that "equitable relief may be granted upon a showing of 
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UC&L argues that recognizing the doctrine of equitable excuse would upset the 
entire law of contracts and turn countless leases on their heads. This position is difficult 
to reconcile with the real-world fact that courts accepting the strict compliance rule 
demonstrate virtually universal acceptance of the doctrine. In fact, UC&L's position, 
which would reject the doctrine entirely, has virtually no support in case law. 
The equitable excuse doctrine is a narrow exception to the general rule that lease 
options exercise provisions are to be strictly observed. As the Duncan court noted, 
The real estate community . . . may rest assured that lease 
options remain enforceable, and that as a general rule they 
will be strictly enforced according to their terms. We 
emphasize that equitable relief from the strict terms of a 
renewal or purchase option is the rare exception to this rule. 
Duncan v. G.E.W.. Inc.. 526 A.2d 1358, 1365 (D.C. App. 1987). 
fraud, accident or mistake"); Benetti v. Kishner. 558 P.2d 537, 539 (Nev. 1977) 
(remanding to determine whether facts are present justifying equitable excuse); Carsten v. 
Eickhoff. 323 N.E.2d 664, 669 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (recognizing availability of equitable 
relief but finding insufficient evidence of fraud, accident, surprise or mistake); Koch v. 
H. & S. Dev. Co.. 249 Miss. 590, 624 (Miss. 1964) (recognizing doctrine in cases of 
"accident, mistake, forgetfulness, inadvertence and oversight" but finding no record of 
these circumstances in dispute); McClellan v. Ashley. 104 SE.2d 55, 58 (Va. 1958) 
(finding "before equity may relieve the lessee of the consequences of his failure to give 
the notice, there must be equitable grounds for such relief, such as fraud, mistake, 
surprise or accident"); Medomak Canning Co. v. York. 57 A.2d 745, 747 -48 (Me. 1948) 
(finding no special circumstances warranting equitable relief); Myers v. Silljacks. 58 Md. 
319, 329 (Md. 1882) (stating "there is no doubt but that a Court of equity will, in a proper 
case ... decree specific performance of the covenant to renew a lease...."). See also 
Missouri Goodwill Indus, v. Johannsmever. 901 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) 
(court distinguished an option to terminate a lease from an option to extend a lease, and 
acknowledged that Missouri has not expressly adopted equitable excuse doctrine, but 
discussed at some length favorable cases from other jurisdictions). 
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Application of the doctrine requires a thorough balancing of the equities. Only 
where they weigh heavily for the option holder will strict compliance with an option's 
o 
terms be excused. These considerations can be summarized as follows: 
[EJquity will give relief to a lessee who has failed to exercise 
the option within the required time, if [1] the delay is slight, 
[2] the delay has not prejudiced the landlord, and [3] the 
failure to grant relief would result in such hardship to the 
tenant as to make literal enforcement of the renewal provision 
unconscionable. 
Fletcher v. Frisbee. 404 A.2d 1106, 1108-09 (N.H. 1979). See also Aickin v. Ocean View 
Inv. Co.. 935 P.2d 992, 998 (Hawaii 1997). Applying each of these three factors to the 
present case, the district court correctly excused White Pine's failure to comply timely 
with the Lease's notice requirement. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE EQUITABLE 
EXCUSE DOCTRINE TO THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THIS CASE 
The law required the district court to balance (1) the hardship caused to White 
Pine by strictly enforcing the Lease's renewal provision; (2) the prejudice UC&L 
suffered due to White Pine's delay in complying with this provision; and (3) the facts 
UC&L claims that, in some of the cases granting relief under the equitable excuse 
doctrine, the courts really grant relief based on a finding of inequitable or inappropriate 
conduct by the lessor. (App. Br. at 23 n.l 1). A review of the cases cited by UC&L for 
this proposition shows that the courts made no such finding, and instead rely on 
traditional balancing of the equities between the tenant and landlord, and an examination 
of the facts surrounding the tenant's delay. See Wharf Restaurant Inc. v. Port of Seattle, 
605 P.2d 334, 341 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979); J.N.A. Realty Corp. v. Cross Bay Chelsea, 
Inc., 366N.E.2d 1313, 1317-18 (N.Y. 1977); Linn Corp. v. LaSalle Natl Bank, 424 
N.E.2d 676, 679 (111. Ct. App. 1981); Trollen v. City of Wabasha. 287 N.W.2d 645, 647-
48 (Minn. 1979). Indeed, "the determination of the court turns not on a single factor but 
on the balancing of the equities between the parties." Gardner v. HKT Realty Corp., 744 
S.W.2d 735, 738 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988). See Linn Corp. v. LaSalle National Bank, 424 
N.E.2d 676, 679 (111. 1981) (noting that application of equity is governed by several 
factors); Johnson, supra at 270 ("[L]awsuits of this nature generally resolve into an 
equitable balancing of the hardship to the tenant caused by the failure to grant relief, 
versus the prejudice to the landlord resulting from the delay in giving the notice as 
required.") 
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surrounding White Pine's delay. The district court correctly ruled that White Pine was 
equitably excused from strict compliance with the Lease's renewal provision. 
A. Strict Enforcement of The Lease's Renewal Provision Would Result In An 
Inequitable Forfeiture to White Pine 
The first and most important factor to be considered is whether strictly enforcing 
the Lease's renewal provision would have caused White Pine an "inequitable forfeiture." 
Wharf Restaurant. Inc. v. Port of Seattle. 605 P.2d 334, 341 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979). Such 
an inequitable forfeiture is generally demonstrated by showing that "permanent 
improvements had been made on the premises by the lessee with the intention of 
exercising its option and remaining on the premises." Id Other courts are in accord. 
See, e.g.. Aickin. 935 P.2d at 1001 (excusing delay in exercising option because "[fjirst, 
and most significantly, Lessees made substantial improvements totaling approximately 
$142,038 to the premises"); Linn Corp. v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank. 424 N.E.2d 676, 679 (111. 
App. Ct. 1981) (tenant who made $200,000 in improvements, and failed to exercise 
renewal options, may be equitably excused from strict compliance); J.N.A. Realty Corp. 
v. Cross Bay Chelsea. Inc.. 366N.E.2d 1313, 1317-18 (N.Y. 1977) (equitable excuse 
appropriate where tenant made $55,000 in improvements). 
Although this is the most important factor, and the district court clearly explained 
that strictly enforcing the Lease's renewal provision would have resulted in such a 
hardship to White Pine as to make enforcement unconscionable, UC&L's brief almost 
entirely ignores this element of the test. UC&L cannot ignore, however, the following 
undisputed facts: White Pine made significant permanent improvements to the Building 
with the intention of remaining there for the Lease's full 20-year term. Before White 
Pine's renovations, the Building was in a state of structural disrepair. The entire lower 
floor was unusable except for storage; UC&L had unsuccessfully tried to lease the 
Building for approximately six months. (R. 538, 543-546, 550-551, 570-71, 599). White 
Pine was forced to incur massive costs for permanent improvements before it was able to 
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occupy the Building. White Pine spent $148,000 in renovation expenses, $105,000 of 
which were for permanent improvements to the Building, including tearing down the 
Building's existing interior structures and fixtures; replacing the Building's wiring, 
plumbing, and structural components; and completely building out the lower floor, 
thereby doubling the rentable space in the Building. (R. 261-263, 292-298, 522-526, 
596-595, 707). UC&L admits that White Pine's expenditures significantly increased the 
Building's value. Both White Pine and UC&L knew that White Pine would need to 
occupy the Building for the full 20 years under the Lease recover White Pine's $148,000 
investment in the Building. (R. 73-75, 253-254, 278, 547-548, 535, 594, 706). 
Strict enforcement of the Lease would have forfeited almost all of White Pine's 
investment in the Building, giving UC&L an undeserved windfall. This loss likely would 
have forced White Pine out of business altogether. (R. 592, 706). Under these 
circumstances, the district court correctly concluded, based on the undisputed facts, that 
the equities weighed heavily for White Pine when the first factor for invoking the 
doctrine of equitable excuse was considered. 
B. Equitably Excusing White Pine's Strict Compliance Did Not Unduly 
Prejudice UC&L 
The second factor to be considered in determining the availability of the equitable 
excuse exception is the harm to UC&L as a result of White Pine's delay in giving written 
notice of its intent to exercise the option. "The test to determine whether [the landlord] 
was injured by the delay is whether he changed his position or suffered a detriment 
because of [the tenant's] delay in giving notice of renewal." Aickin v. Ocean View Inv. 
Co., 935 P.2d 992, 1001 (Hawaii 1997) (emphasis added). In this case, the district court 
concluded that equitably excusing White Pine's delay in complying with the Lease's 
renewal provision was appropriate because UC&L would suffer no harm as a result. 
The courts have described what constitutes requisite harm under this standard. For 
instance, "[h]ardship would exist if active negotiations regarding the sale of the property 
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had been in progress when the notice deadline arose and the landlord lost the sale because 
of the [tenant's] delay." Fletcher v. Frisbee. 404 A.2d 1106, 1108 (N.H. 1979). 
Correspondingly, no such hardship exists and this element of the equitable excuse 
doctrine is satisfied where the landlord "has not actively tried to market the property nor 
is there any evidence on record that [the landlord] has received any offers from third 
parties to buy or lease the premises." Flemming Cos. v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 818 P.2d 
813, 819 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991). 
In examining hardship to the landlord, courts also consider whether applying the 
equitable excuse doctrine "is in fact promoting the real commercial expectations of the 
parties." Duncan v. G.E.W., Inc., 526 A.2d 1358, 1365 (D.C. App. 1987). Such 
commercial expectations are often manifested by improvements made to the leased 
property. For instance, in Linn Corp. v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 424 N.E.2d 676, 679 (111. Ct. 
App. 1981), the court applied the equitable excuse doctrine to a tenant who failed timely 
to renew a lease with an initial two year term, and two subsequent five year terms. The 
court noted that the lease required the tenant to improve the property and concluded that 
this provision confirmed that "the parties did not intend by the terms of the lease for [the 
tenant] to make such improvements merely for the right to use the property for only two 
years." Id. 
The only real harm that UC&L alleges is that it was denied the opportunity to re-
lease the property at sharply higher rates, or to sell it at a large profit. However, courts 
have rejected such claims of harm. A landlord may not demonstrate hardship by arguing 
that its right to sell or lease the property was prejudiced by the tenant's continued 
occupancy. See Fletcher, 404 A.2d at 1108. "This suggests that the cause of the 
landlord's hardship was not the [tenant's] delay in giving notice, but rather the [tenant's] 
mere presence on the property." Id If true, "it cannot be concluded that the landlord 
suffered prejudice as a result of the [tenant's] delay." Id. (emphasis added). There is no 
question that the Lease was a very good deal for UC&L at the time it was made, and 
159180 21 
neither party could forsee the dramatic increases in rental values that have taken place 
since. In fact, it is only because of these unforseen rent increases that UC&L is even 
attempting to remove White Pine. 
White Pine's 11-day delay in notifying UC&L of its intent to renew the Lease 
caused no harm or prejudice to UC&L. Indeed, it was undisputed that, during this 11-day 
period, UC&L took no action whatsoever in reliance on White Pine's delay. UC&L did 
not even attempt to sell or re-lease the Building, let alone actually find a purchaser or 
substitute tenant, in reliance on White Pine's delay. 
More important, the district court's decision to allow White Pine to renew the 
Lease fulfilled the parties' commercial expectations under the Lease. The Lease 
contemplates a lengthy term, accomplished by exercising three renewal options. UC&L 
has acknowledged that it fully expected White Pine to exercise these options and "would 
have been shocked" if White Pine did not do so. In fact, UC&L commissioned an 
appraisal valuing its property under the assumption that White Pine would remain in the 
Building for the Lease's entire 20-year term. UC&L expected White Pine to exercise the 
option, and White Pine gave written notice of its intent to do so before the expiration of 
the Lease's primary term. And in any event, UC&L is already receiving a much higher 
lease rate from White Pine than it was previously receiving, the Lease does provide for 
rent adjustments based on an agreed index, and White Pine has been a model tenant. 
Under these undisputed facts, UC&L did not suffer an injury warranting reversal of the 
district court's application of the equitable excuse doctrine. 
C. White Pine's Delay Was Excusable And Inconsequential 
The third factor that is to be considered concerns the circumstances surrounding 
the failure of the tenant to comply with the strict terms of the lease renewal option 
provision. The equitable excuse doctrine "permits a court of equity to relieve against loss 
of an option to extend a lease where there has been excusable and inconsequential 
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tardiness." Trollen v. Citv of Wabasha. 287 N.W.2d 645, 647-48 (Minn. 1979). In light 
of the brevity and inadvertence of White Pine's 11-day delay in complying with the 
Lease's renewal provision, and its promptness in giving notice after discovering the 
mistake, the district court correctly concluded that this element was satisfied. 
In determining whether delay in exercising an option is excusable and 
inconsequential, courts evaluate the length of delay in the context of the total duration of 
the lease at issue. See Aickin v. Ocean View Inv. Co.. 935 P.2d 992, 1000 (Hawaii 1997) 
("We do not believe a four-month delay, within the context of a ten-year lease of 
potentially fifty years' total duration, was unreasonably long."). Also, courts are 
especially inclined to find that a delay is excusable if the lessee acted promptly upon 
discovering a mistake as to when notice is required. See Nanuet Nat'l Bank v. Saramo 
Holding Co.. 545 N.Y.S.2d 734, 735 (App. Div. 1989) (noting that delay did not preclude 
equitable excuse doctrine because "upon learning of his oversight, [the lessee] 
immediately notified [the lessor]"). Courts are also more likely to excuse delay if "the 
current.. . leasehold had not expired when [the tenant] gave its notice of intent to 
renew." Car-X Service Systems. Inc. v. Heller. 927 F.2d 511, 515 (10th Cir. 1991) 
(applying Kansas law). See also Aickin v. Ocean View Inv. Co.. 935 P.2d 992, 1000 
(Hawaii 1997) (affirming application of equitable excuse doctrine based, in part, upon 
fact that ("[lessees' original. . . lease term had not yet expired when they tendered 
written notice . . . of their intent to renew"); Fleming Cos. v. Equitable Life Ins.. 818 P.2d 
813, 818 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (delay was slight because the "original lease term had not 
yet expired when [the lessee] properly tendered written notice of its intent to renew"). 
In determining whether a lessee's delay is sufficiently brief to warrant application 
of the equitable excuse doctrine, courts also consider whether "[t]he failure to give notice 
was purely inadvertent." Wharf Restaurant. Inc. v. Port of Seattle. 605 P.2d 334, 341 
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(Wash. Ct. App. 1979).9 In Wharf, the lessee "simply forgot" to provide written notice of 
intent to extend the lease, and the court thus ruled that this failure "was not the result of 
intentional, culpable or . . . 'grossly negligent' conduct." Id, at 336, 341. Similarly, in 
J.N.A. Realty Corp. v. Cross Bay Chelsea, Inc.. 366 N.E.2d 1313, 1317-18 (N.Y. 1977), 
the court ruled that the equitable excuse doctrine applied because the tenant's failure to 
strictly comply with the lease renewal option was due to "mere venial inattention." This 
Court in Geisdorf, following other courts, characterized this element of the test as 
satisfied "when the optionee's 'conduct in failing to comply was not due to willful or 
gross negligence on the part of the optionee but was rather the result of an honest and 
justifiable mistake.'" Geisdorf 972 P.2d at 71. However, such inadvertent and 
blameless failure was not before the Court in Geisdorf where the tenant testified that he 
"never even considered [exercising the option] in writing." 972 P.2d at 73 (alteration in 
original). 
In light of the undisputed facts surrounding White Pine's delay in notifying UC&L 
of its intent to renew the Lease, the district court correctly concluded that White Pine had 
satisfied this element. The district court also recognized, however, that this element, by 
itself, is not sufficient to invoke the doctrine of equitable excuse. The district court's 
conclusion is based on the following: First, White Pine's delay in giving notice was 
brief. Within hours of discovering its mistake on July 22, 1998, White Pine provided 
written notice of its intent to exercise the option. The total delay was a mere 11 days, a 
trivial delay when viewed in the context of the Lease's 20-year term. Courts routinely 
9
 Citing no authority for the proposition, UC&L insists that inadvertence for purposes of 
the equitable excuse doctrine should be evaluated under the "ordinary diligence" standard 
applicable to recision and mistake claims. However, White Pine seeks to equitably apply 
the term contemplated by the Lease, and to further the parties' undisputed intentions, not 
to undo the entire transaction. Also, the inadvertence of the mistake is only part of the 
inquiry. As noted above, courts also examine the extent of the delay in relation to the 
term of the lease, the alacrity with which the tenant remedies its mistake, and the 
financial harm to the tenant if equitable relief is not granted. These considerations have 
nothing to do with the analysis applicable to recision or mistake. 
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excuse significantly longer delays by lessees. See Aickin. 935 P.2d at 1001 (four month 
delay in giving notice); Linn Corp., 424 N.E.2d at 679 (more than two month delay in 
giving notice); Wharf Restaurant, 605 P.2d at 341 (more than two month delay in giving 
notice); Duncan, 526 A.2d at 1364 ("[T]he delay in giving notice was slight; oral notice 
was provided within seventeen days of the deadline, and written notice six days after 
that."). 
Second, White Pine's delay in giving written notice was purely inadvertent. As 
Kathy Sturgis testified: "I honestly missed it." The Sturgises relied on mistaken advice 
from their prior legal counsel regarding the default and notice provisions of the Lease, 
believing that these provisions would cover any possible notices under the Lease. The 
Sturgises, who own and operate a family business, also were distracted by a number of 
business and personal concerns. While they do not, in and of themselves, mandate 
equitably excusing strict compliance, these distractions clearly manifest a mistake that 
was honest and inadvertent, not grossly negligent or intentional. 
UC&L's focus on the word "justifiable" simply proves too much. (App. Br. at 26-
29, 30-32) In effect, UC&L would have the Court adopt a definition of honest and 
justifiable mistake that would require proof of deception or other misleading conduct on 
the part of the landlord, or a definition that would transform a mistake into something 
other than a mistake. This is not the law in the jurisdictions that have interpreted the 
doctrine. In the vast majority of cases that have applied the doctrine, there was no proof 
that the landlord was guilty of misconduct. In these cases, the tenant's mistake was just 
that—a mistake. This Court in Geisdorf recognized that a mistake will satisfy this 
element of the test "when the optionee's 'conduct in failing to comply was not due to 
willful or gross negligence on the part of the optionee . . . ." 972 P.2d at 71. An "honest 
and justifiable mistake," in this context, is and should be defined by juxtaposing it against 
"willful or gross negligence." 
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Under these circumstances, and given all of the undisputed facts, the Sturgises' 
mistake did not preclude the district court from equitably excusing ritualistic performance 
of the Lease's notice of renewal requirement. 
III. UC&L'S ARGUMENTS AMOUNT TO IMPERMISSIBLE 
UNPRESERVED CLAIMS 
In an attempt to undermine the district court's conclusion that the three-factor test 
for equitable excuse was met, UC&L argues in Point III of its brief that the facts relied 
upon by the district court were disputed, or that the evidence submitted by White Pine 
was somehow lacking, thus making summary judgment inappropriate. Specifically, 
UC&L challenges the evidentiary basis of the district court's finding that White Pine's 
delay was an honest and justifiable mistake, that White Pine would suffer harm by strictly 
enforcing the Lease, and that UC&L suffered no harm due to White Pine's delay. UC&L 
has chosen now to dispute previously undisputed facts, such as those relating to White 
Pine's negotiations with Park City and White Pine's business and domestic distractions. 
The simple answer to these assertions is that UC&L never raised any of these 
arguments before the district court; therefore, it may not raise them here. This Court 
adheres to a "longstanding rule that [it] will not consider issues raised for the first time on 
appeal." Julian v. State. 966 P.2d 249, 258 (Utah 1998). See also Monson v. Carver. 928 
P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996). To preserve issues for appeal, parties must raise them in a 
manner in which the "trial court [is] offered an opportunity to rule on [the] issue." 
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). "A trial court has the 
opportunity to rule if the following three requirements are met: (1) 'the issue must be 
raised in a timely fashion;' (2) 'the issue must be specifically raised;' and (3) a party must 
introduce 'supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
The district court ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment in which none of 
the facts advanced by White Pine were disputed by UC&L. UC&L's arguments on 
summary judgment challenged the applicable legal standards governing White Pine's 
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claims, but not the underlying facts. (R. 152-246, 611-708). At oral argument on the 
cross-motions for summary judgment, UC&L's counsel stated that "realistically the facts 
are not disputed at all . . . . [Tjhere's a myriad of issues for your Honor to decide; 
however, none of them are fact related." (R. 1072-74).n 
In response to some of the undisputed facts White Pine submitted on summary 
judgment, UC&L simply stated "disputed to the extent that the cited portions of the 
record do not establish the facts as alleged in that paragraph." (R. 708). However, this 
perfunctory statement does not qualify as a valid factual dispute under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(e), which required UC&L to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial," and to support such facts with affidavits or deposition testimony. 
Because UC&L failed to properly dispute facts before the district court on summary 
judgment, it certainly cannot raise factual disputes on appeal. See Jensen v. IHC Hosps., 
Inc.. 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997). 
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 UC&L's blanket assertion that this Court weighs evidence and determines the facts in 
equity cases mischaracterizes applicable case law. 
It is true that in cases of equity this Court may weigh the 
evidence and determine the facts. However, it is well 
established in our decisional law that due to the advantaged 
position of the trial court there is indulged a presumption of 
correctness of the findings and judgment; and that where the 
evidence may conflict we do not upset the lower court's 
findings unless the evidence clearly preponderates against 
them. 
Qvard v. Cannon. 600 P.2d 1246, 1248 (Utah 1979) (emphasis in original). As 
recognized in the case cited by UC&L, Bustamante v. Bustamante. 645 P.2d 40, 42 (Utah 
1982), in equity cases, "although this Court may under some circumstances reassess the 
facts , . . . . [gjenerally, we defer to the findings of fact of the trial judge unless the 
findings are based on an erroneous standard." UC&L's request that this Court determine 
the facts in this case is flawed for at least three reasons. First, this standard applies only 
when there are disputed factual issues presented to the trial court, and the trial court 
makes a finding based on those facts. In Bustamante. for example, the trial court entered 
findings as to a disputed factual issue regarding residency for divorce purposes. See id. 
In this case, UC&L admitted all of the facts upon which the district court granted 
summary judgment. There are simply no factual disputes for this Court to weigh. 
Second, UC&L is not asking the Court to "re-weigh" the evidence it presented to the 
district court; instead, it is asking this Court to decide new facts that it never presented to 
the district court. Third, UC&L not only asks this Court to decide new facts, it also asks 
this Court to consider a host of new arguments that UC&L could and should have 
presented to the district court. UC&L cites no authority for this proposition, and it is 
contrary to the long line of cases that prohibit raising new issues on appeal. See Julian v. 
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Now, on appeal, UC&L asks this Court to revisit a host of fact-related issues, 
including the following: 
• In the district court, UC&L admitted all of the facts set forth above regarding 
the distractions the Sturgises faced during the option period. It also admitted that the 
Sturgises had, at the time they signed the Lease, understood that the 30-day cure clause, 
which required notice by the landlord, would cover the notice to extend requirement. (R. 
592-93, 706). On appeal, UC&L argues that White Pine never really quantified exactly 
how distracting these various matters were, or exactly when they happened, or exactly 
how much time they occupied. (App. Br. at 34-36). UC&L also claims that "the [30-day 
cure] provision of the Lease played no role in the actual events before the court. . . ." 
(App. Br. at 32). Not only did UC&L fail to raise these arguments below, or even 
attempt to challenge the Sturgises5 explanation of why the missed the deadline, they did 
not pursue any of these issues in discovery. If UC&L believed that these questions 
constituted a legitimate reason to deny summary judgment, it could and should have 
raised them with the district court. 
• In the district court, UC&L admitted that if White Pine is denied equitable 
relief, it will "lose the entirety of its $148,000 investment in the Utah Coal and Lumber 
Building" and also admitted that, if not equitably excused, White Pine would likely lose 
its business altogether. (R. 592, 706). Now, on appeal, UC&L argues that because White 
Pine operated for years at another location, it would be "hard pressed to establish that its 
customer relationships would be ruptured in a town as small as Park City." (App. Br. at 
39). UC&L also argues that White Pine would not really lose the value of its investment 
in the Building, but would instead only lose "the unamortized or otherwise unrecouped 
value of such improvements." (App. Br. at 40). UC&L says that summary judgment was 
State. 966 P.2d 249, 258 (Utah 1998); Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844, 847 
(Utah 1998). 
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improper because White Pine did not offer evidence of the unamortized value in 1999. 
UC&L raises this argument for the first time on appeal. More important, the undisputed 
evidence demonstrated that White Pine expected to recoup the value of its investment 
over a twenty-year period. In proceedings before the district court, UC&L admitted (1) 
that "White Pine would never have made [these] expenditures unless it could be assured 
occupancy of the building for twenty years" and (b) that "The Sturgises believed—and 
UC&L knew the Sturgises believed—that it would be necessary for White Pine to occupy 
the building this long in order to recover their significant investment in the building." (R. 
594, 706). 
• In the district court, UC&L admitted "that the money White Pine spent 
renovating the building has increased the building's value significantly." (R. 594, 706). 
On appeal, UC&L argues that "the record contains no real evidence that Utah Coal will 
ultimately benefit to any significant extent from White Pine's 1993 improvements, much 
less be 'unjustly' enriched as a result of them." (App. Br. at 40). 
UC&L cannot escape the consequence of its failure to raise these purported factual 
issues and arguments specifically, timely, and with supporting authority and evidence. In 
other words, UC&L did not provide the district court with an opportunity to rule on the 
arguments presented in Point III of its brief, and this Court should decline to consider 
them. 
IV. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT, IN ANY EVENT, ENTER JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF UC&L 
Throughout its brief, UC&L requests that this Court not only reverse the district 
court's grant of summary judgment, but that it order entry of judgment in favor of 
UC&L. The Court should not do so. If for some reason the Court concludes that 
undisputed facts presented by White Pine do not satisfy the requirements of the equitable 
excuse doctrine, the Court should remand the case for trial. White Pine believes that the 
district court correctly ruled in its favor as a matter of law. But if the Court announces a 
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new set of rules governing the doctrine of equitable excuse, White Pine should be 
entitled, at the very least, to further proceedings before the district court and, if necessary, 
a trial on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
In Utah as in other jurisdictions, the equitable excuse doctrine is a viable exception 
to the general rule requiring strict compliance with lease renewal options. The district 
court did exactly what relevant case law required it to do: it examined all of the equities 
on the basis of testimony that UC&L admitted to be undisputed. The undisputed facts 
demonstrate that the equitable excuse doctrine relieves White Pine of strict compliance 
with the Lease's renewal provision in this singular and limited instance. Therefore, this 
Court should affirm the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in White 
Pine's favor. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of March, 2001. 
SNELL & WlLMER, LLP. 
Alan L. Sullivan 
Todd M. Shaughnessy 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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THIS LEASE AGREEMENT (this "Lease") is made and entered into this / j ^ _ day of ApriH 
1993, by and between UTAH COAL & LUMBER RESTAURANT, INC, a Utah corporation, hereinafter 
called "Landlord," and OUTDOOR ENDEAVORS UNLIMITED, INC., a Utah corporation dba White 
Pine Touring, hereinafter called 'Tenant/ 
WITNESSETH 
In consideration of the covenants and agreements of the respective parties contained in this 
Lease and the mutual benefits to be derived therefrom, the parties agree as follows: 
DEMISED PREMISES 
On the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in this Lease, Landlord leases to Tenant, and 
Tenant rents from Landlord, those certain premises (the "Premises") consisting of approximately 4,712 
square feet on the main floor and lower level of the building commonly known as the "Utah CoaJ & 
Lumber Building" located at 201 Heber Avenue, Park City, Utah (the "Building"), as shown on the plot 
plan attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference. The Building is a 
designated historical site and Tenant's occupancy must be conducted in a manner consistent with the 
preservation of the Building in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations. The Premises are 
contained within a site which is being further developed by Landlord and Landlord ahall have the right to 
improve the surrounding Premises in a manner Landlord deems appropriate to facilitate future 
development. 
The Premises are leased to Tenant for the primary term of five (5) years beginning on July 1, 
1993, provided that^ if the necessary approvals for occupancy are not obtained from Park City prior to 
that date, the primary term shall commence on the earlier of the date occupancy is permitted by Park City 
or October 1, 1993 (the "Commencement Date"), and ending on the same date in the year 1998. To the 
extent that the primary term commences after July 1, 1993, but before October U 1993, the rent shall be 
prorated so that the Tenant pays only one-half of the applicable rent for the primary term (for example, 
$1,375 for one month.) Tenant shall have the right to extend the term of the lease for three (3) separate 
and additional consecutive periods of five (5) years each, which right shall be exercised by Tenant 
providing Landlord with written notice thereof not more than one hundred twenty (120) nor less than 
sixty (60) days prior to expiration of the primary or any extended term. Each such extended term shall 
be on the same terms and conditions as set forth herein, except that rent shall be adjusted as hereinafter 
provided. 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF LEASE 
This Lease is made on the following terms and conditions which are expressly agreed to by 
landlord and Tenant: 
1. Rent-
(a) During the first and second year of the primary term of this Lease, Tenant agrees 
to pay as rent to Landlord, at the address specified in this Lease or at such other place as 
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Landlord may from time to time designate in writing, the sum of Thirty-Three Thousand 
Dollars ($33,000.00). During the third, fourth, and fifth year of the primary term of this 
Lease, the minimum rent shall be Fifty Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($50,500.00). 
AH such sums to be paid in lawful money of the United States in equal monthly 
installments in advance* with the initial payment due on the Commencement Date, and 
subsequent payments due on the same day of each succeeding month during the term 
hereof. 
(b) During any extended five year term, the rent shall be the rent that was in effect at 
the end of die term then just ended multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is 
the Consumer Price Index as published by the United States Department of Labor for die 
last month of the then expiring term and the denominator of which is the Consumer Price 
Index for the first month of the then expiring term. For example, if the rent at the end of 
the fifth year is $55,500 per year, and the numerator of the Consumer Price Index is 110 
and the denominator is 100, the new rent for the succeeding term shall be $60,500. 
2. Security Deposit Tenant hereby deposits with Landlord and shall maintain at all times 
on deposit with Landlord the sum of $2,750 as a security deposit for the faithful performance by Tenant 
of all terms and conditions of this Lease. Tenant may not designate any of the security deposit for 
payment of rent for any portion of the term of this Lease as the sum is to be held as security and to be 
returned only at the expiration of the Lease and the completion of all duties by Tenant Landlord may 
but shall not be required to use or apply the security deposit to any payment of any amount due by 
Tenant or to cure any default by Tenant or for any loss or damage suffered by Landlord by reason of 
Tenant's default. If any portion of the security deposit is so used, Landlord shall so notify Tenant and 
Tenant within ten (10) days shall deposit an amount sufficient to return the deposit to $2,750. Landlord 
shall not be require to keep the security deposit separate from any of its general funds and Tenant shall 
not be entitled to any interest on such security deposit. If Tenant has faithfully and fully performed all of 
the provisions, terms, and conditions of this Lease, upon its expiration Landlord shall return the security 
deposit to Tenant within there (30) days of the termination of this Lease. 
3. Authorized Use. Tenant shall have the right to use the Premises for the operation of a 
retail outlet selling sporting goods and equipment and for no other purpose whatsoever without the prior 
written consent of Landlord. 
4. Tenant to Insure Building. Tenant shall insure and keep insured the Building, including 
the Premises and any improvements thereto, against the perils of fire, lightning, and all other perils under 
an extended coverage hazard policy, relieving Landlord of any and all obligations of providing insurance 
as to the Premises and the activities there conducted. Insurance proceeds shall be made payable to 
Landlord and Tenant as their interests may appear and shall be in an amount sufficient to provide 
recovery in the event of loss of one hundred percent (100%) of the insurable replacement value of the 
Building, the Premises, and any improvements thereto. Such insurance shall be provided by a company 
or companies reasonably acceptable to Landlord and shall be procured and paid for by Tenant Such 
insurance may, at Tenant's election, be carried under any general blanket insurance policy of Tenant; 
provided however, that a satisfactory certificate of the insurer evidencing insurance carried with proof of 
payment of the premium shall be deposited with Landlord. Each such policy shall contain a provision, 
endorsement, or similar agreement by the insurer that it will give Landlord at least thirty (30) days 
written notice before any such policy(ies) shall be altered or cancelled. 
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5. fVmdltfnn of fha Promises. Tenant accepts the Premises in the same condition they are 
in at the time o[ the signing of this Lease; provided that, Landlord agrees to pay, or to give Tenant a 
credit against rents duo, for the cost of installation of a fire sprinkler system satisfactory to Park City; 
any structural improvements to the Building required by Parjc City to use the Premises as a retail outlet; 
cost of grading the lumber yard for drainage and utility, and fifty percent (50%) of the cost of installing a 
new heating system, either a gas forced air or a gas-fired boiler/radiant heat system. Tenant shall be 
responsible for all other remodeling and improvements necessary or desirable to use the Premises as a 
retail outlet Tenant agrees that if Tenant ohanges the usual method of conducting Tenant's business on 
the Premises, or should Tenant install thereon or therein any new facilities, Tenant will, at the cost and 
expense of Tenant, make alterations or improvements in or to the Premises which may be required in 
accordance with any federal or state law, any municipal ordinance, or regulation applicable thereto, 
o\ Rapnir and C^ nf Building and Premises bv Tenant. Tenant will not commit any waste 
of the Premises, nor shall it use or permit the use of the Premises in violation of any prtscnt or future law 
of the United States or of the state In which said Premises are located, or h\ violation of any municipal 
ordinance or regulation applicable thereto. Other than as specifically assumed by Landlord in paragraph 
6, Tenant agrees to ktfep the interior and the exterior of the Building, the improvements on the Premises, 
and the grounds in good condition and repair, including all labor, materials, and other repairs to the 
electrical fixtures, plumbing, appliances, air conditioning, and heating systems (including spring and fall 
servicing, as recommended by the manuftoturcr, and replaoemant of filters as necessary); the removal of 
snow, mowing of grass, care of shrubs, general yard maintenance, and landscaping; and the cleaning and 
painting of the interior and exterior of the Building as may be necessary In order to maintain the 
Building, Premises, and surrounding area in a clean, attractive, and sanitary condition. Tenant shall keep 
die driveways and sidewalks, if any, reasonably tree from ice and snow and assume all other obligations 
of repair and maintenance of the Premises as required. 
7, Exterior of Building. Landlord agrees to maintain V\o root; foundation, and exterior 
walls of the Building, except painting of the exterior walls whioh shall be maintained by Tenant and 
except for any maintenance that may be required as a result of the act or negligence of Tenant or Tenant 
improvements. Landlord shall not, however, be obligatod to repair any such damage until written notice 
of the need of repair shall have been given to Landlord by Tenant, and alter such notice is so given* 
Landlord shall have a reasonable time in which to make such repairs. 
Landlord agrees that if in an emergency it shall become necessary to perform any maintenance or 
make any repairs hereby required to be made by Landlord and Landlord cannot be located by telephone, 
Tenant may, at its option, have die maintenance or repairs made and pay the cost thereof and, in such 
ovont, Landlord agrees to reimburse Tenant therefor upon demand, or, if not so reimbursed, Tenant may 
deduct the amount so expended by it from the rent or other sums due Landlord from Tenant. 
3. Alteration of Building and Insinuation of Fixtures and Other Appurtenance*. Tenant 
may, subject to the prior written consent of Landlord, said consent not to be unreasonably withheld or 
delayed, but at Tenant*a own eo9t and expense, and in a good and workmanlike manner, make such 
alterations and repairs In the Building as Tenant may require for the conduct of its business without, 
however, materially altering £h© basio character or appearance of the Building or improvements, or 
weakening the structure of the Building. Tenant shall appropriately dispose of Hems removed or 
replaced in Such renovation. In addition, Tenant shall have the right, without the permission of Landlord, 
lo erect, at Tenants sole cost and expense, such temporary partitions as may be necessary or desirable to 
facilitate the handling of Tenant's business and to install electrical fixtures, shelves, trade fixtures. 
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additional lights* and wiring. Any alterations, improvements, or fixtures mode or added to the Building, 
including permanent partitions, all electrical fixtures, lights, and wiring, shall be installed in 
conformance with applicable laws and ordinances and shall, at the election of Landlord, become the 
property of Landlord at the expiration or sooner termination of this Lease. Should Landlord request 
Tenant to remove all or any part of the above-mentioned items, Tenant shall do so prior to the expiration 
of this Lease drtd repair the Premises aa described below. Sholvos, temporary partitions, blinds, trade 
fixtures, and appliances installed by Tenant shall remain the property of Tenant and may be removed by 
Tenant at any time; provided, however, that aJI covenants, Inoluding rent, due hereunder to Landlord 
shall have been complied with and paid. At the expiration or sooner termination of this Lease or any 
extension thereof, Tenant shall remove said shelves, temporary partitions, blinds, and appliances, and 
repair, in a good and workmanlike manner, all damage done to the Premises by such removal. Tenant 
shall not exercise the HgHt and privilege granted by this paragraph 7 In such manner as to damage or 
affect the structural qualities of the Building. 
9. Parking. Tenant shall have the right to share (no exclusive rights to any parking) in any 
onsite parking that may exist on the property owned by Landlord on which die Building is located. 
Landlord shall have no obligation to repair, plow fof snow, or otherwise maintain the parking area. 
10. Payment of Taxes imd Other Assessments. 
(a) Tenant shall pay all Property Taxes, license Tecs, and assessments levied or 
Imposed against the Premises and Building during the term of this Lease or any 
extension thereof by any federal, state, municipal, or other governmental authority. 
"Property taxes" shall mean all taxos, assessments, levies, and charges, whether special, 
extraordinary, or otherwise, whether foreseen or unforeseen, which may be levied, 
assessed, or Imposed upon, on account of or with respect to the ownership of and/or all 
other taxable interests in the Premises or Building. Should the taxing authorities Include 
in such Property Taxes the value of any Improvements made by Tenant or include 
machinery, equipment, fixtures, inventory, or other personal property of Tenant, then 
Tenant shall also pay the entire Property Taxes for such items. A tax bill submitted by 
Landlord to Tenant shall be conclusive evidence of the amount of taxes assessed or 
levied as well as the frama taxed. Tenant shall provide to Landlord evidence of payment 
of such Property Taxes prior to delinquency. Property Taxes for the 1993 year shall be 
prorated based on din number of months from the Commencement Data through the end 
of the year, The property tax assessment for the Premises and Building is currently 
included In the taxes for a larger parcel owned by Landlord. Landlord and Tenant agree 
that the tax attributable to the Premises and Building currently equals twenty percent 
(20%) of the tax on the total parcel. In the event that Landlord sells a portion of the 
parcel or constructs addition*) improvements that change die amount of tax levied, the 
tax base for the Premises and Building shall be considered unchanged for the remaining 
current term of this Lease and thereafter shall be based on an appraisal of the Premises 
and Building. The percentage of Tenant's portion of the tax attributable to the Premises 
and Building shall be increased 10% for each option terra exercised by Tenant. 
(b) Tenant shall also be solely responsible for and shall pay before delinquent all 
municipal, county, state, or federal taxes assessed during the term of this Lease against 
any personal property of any kind, owned by or placed in, upon, or around the Premises 
by Tenant No law or practice postponing the payment of such taxes, assessments, or 
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charges until after the termination of this Lease shall relieve Tenant of the obligation to 
make such payments that would otherwise be due and payable during the term hereof 
Payment of property taxes shall be made by Tenant to Landlord not later than thirty (30) 
days following the date on which Landlord provides Tenant with written notice. 
(c) If Tenant fails to pay any of such taxes, charges, or other impositions when due, 
Landlord may pay the same, receive immediate reimbursement from Tenant, and 
thereafter Tenant shall pay one-twelfth of Tenant's portion of the estimated Property 
Taxes each month in advance on the first day of each month with its payment of monthly 
rental. The amount of Property Taxes upon which such payment is to be based shall be 
the most current notice(s) of assessment or tax bill(s) concerning the Premises or, if there 
is none, such amount as Landlord may reasonably estimate. If the amount paid by 
Tenant toward property taxes exceeds the amount actually due (as determined from the 
notice(s) of assessment or tax bill(s) actually covering the period in question), the excess 
shall be credited to Tenant's next succeeding payment(s) pursuant to this subsection. If 
die amount paid by Tenant is less than the actual amount due, Tenant shall pay to 
Landlord the deficiency within ten (10) days after written notice from Landlord. 
Anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding, if Tenant deems excessive or illegal 
any such tax or assessment and the amount thereof is contested by Tenant in good faith, 
Tenant shall furnish to Landlord a bond or other security in form and substance 
reasonably satisfactory to Landlord in an amount equal to the amount of taxes or 
assessments so contested, which bond or security shall guarantee the payment thereof 
with interests and penalties thereon. 
11. Erection and Removal of Signs. Tenant may place suitable signs on the Premises for the 
purpose of indicating tine nature of the business carried on by Tenant in said Premises; provided, 
however, that such signs shall conform to local laws and ordinances and be in keeping with other signs in 
the district where the Premises are located; and provided, further, that the location and size of such signs 
shall be compatible with the appearance of the Building and shall not damage the Premises in any 
manner that cannot be reasonably restored. 
12. Qiasa. Tenant agrees to immediately replace all glass on the Premises which is broken 
or damaged during the term of this Lease with glass of the same quality as that broken or damaged. 
13. Right of Entry bv Landlord. Tenant at any time during this Lease term shall, upon 
request by Landlord, permit inspection of the Premises, whether during Tenant's regular business hours 
or otherwise, and upon reasonable prior notice, by Landlord or Landlord's agents or representatives for 
the purpose of ascertaining the condition of the Premises and in order that Landlord may make such 
repairs as may be required to be made by Landlord under the terms of this Lease. Sixty (60) days prior 
to the expiration of this Lease, Landlord may post suitable notice on the Premises that the same are "For 
Rent" and may show the Premises to prospective tenants at reasonable times and upon reasonable prior 
notice. Landlord may not, however, thereby unnecessarily interfere with the use of the Premises by 
Tenant. 
14. Payment or Utilities. Tenant shall pay all charges, including, but not limited to, charges 
for water, sewer, gas^electricity, refuse collection, and other utilities used on the Premises. 
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15. Assignment and Sublease. Tenant shall not have the right to assign its interest under the 
Lease or sublease the Premises without the prior written consent of Landlord, It is understood and 
agreed that any permitted assignment or sublease shall in no way relieve Tenant from primary 
responsibility to Landlord under this Lease. Any such assignment or sublease is subject to the agreement 
of the assignee(s) or sublessors) to be bound by all of the terms and conditions of this Lease. A sale of a 
majority interest in the Tenant shall be deemed to be an assignment and subject to the provisions of this 
paragraph. 
16. Damage or Destruction: Wajver of Subrogation. If the Premises or any part thereof shall 
damaged or destroyed by fire, flood, or other casualty, and unless otherwise specifically provided below, 
Landlord shall promptly repair all such damage and restore the Premises to the extent that the proceeds 
of insurance as provided by Tenant are sufficient to do so, subject to reasonable delays due to 
adjustments of insurance claims, strikes, and ail other causes (such as timing constraints and third-party 
approvals beyond Landlord's reasonable control). Landlord and Tenant hereby release each other from 
responsibility for loss or damage occurring on or to the Premises or to the contents thereof, caused by 
fire or other hazards, to the extent covered by the extended coverage hazard insurance then in effect, and 
each waives all rights of recovery against the other for such loss or damage. Willful misconduct lawfully 
attributable to either party, whether in whole or in part a contributing cause of the casualty giving rise to 
the loss or damage, shall not be excused under the foregoing release and waiver. 
If the Premises are so damaged or destroyed and Landlord fails to repair the same as required, 
Tenant may terminate this Lease effective as of the date of such damage or destruction by giving notice 
thereof to Landlord unless Landlord shall, after notice thereof from Tenant (which notice may be in 
person or by telephone), immediately take all necessary emergency action so that the Premises can be 
utilized for Tenant's normal business purposes with a minimum of disruption and, thereafter, Landlord, 
as expeditiously as possible and in any event within seven (7) days from the date tenant's notice is given, 
commences removal of the debris and restoration of the Premises. If, notwithstanding such damage or 
destruction, Tenant's business on the premise remains open for business, Landlord's restoration and 
repair shall be completed as soon as reasonably feasible and in any event no later than thirty (30) days 
from the date Tenant's notice is given to Landlord. If the Premises are so damaged or destroyed that in 
the reasonable opinion of Tenant they cannot be used for Tenant's business operations and Landlord 
cannot reasonably be expected to complete restoration and repair of the Premises within one hundred 
twenty (120) days from the date of such damage or destruction, Tenant shall havo the absolute right to 
terminate this Lease upon notice thereof to Landlord. 
In the event of any termination of this Lease pursuant to this article, Tenant shall consent to the 
release of any insurance proceeds applicable to the Building and Premises. Rent shall be paid to the 
effective date of termination but not thereafter, and Tenant shall be entitled to a pcfund of any rent paid 
for any period after such date. 
17. Condemnation. In the event that the Premises or any part thereof shall be condemned for 
public use, Ihtn, and in that event, upon the vesting of title to the same for such public use, Tenant shall 
have the right to terminate this Lease, anything herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding, except 
that Tenant shall have the-right to prove and pursue against the condemning authority the value of 
Tenants leasehold interest, the trade fixtures installed by it, moving expenses, and other special 
damages* In the event of such termination of this Lease, all rent paid in advance shall be apportioned as 
of the date of such termination. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this paragraph, in the event 
that only a part of the Premises shall be so taken and the part not so taken shall, in Tenant's reasonable 
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igment, be sufficient for the continuing operation of tenant's business, tenant shall retain the part not 
so taken and there shall be a proportional reduction in the rent. 
IS. Injuries and Property Damage. Tenant agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Landlord 
of and from any and all claims of any kind or nature arising from Tenant's use of the Premises during the 
term hereof, and Tenant hereby waives all claims against Landlord for damage to goods, wares, or 
merchandise or for injury to persons in and upon the Premises from any cause whatsoever, except such 
as might result from the gross negligence or willftjl misconduct of Landlord or Landlord's representatives 
or from failure of Landlord to perform its obligation hereunder within a reasonable time after notice in 
writing by Tenant requiring such performance by Landlord. Tenant shall at all times during the term 
hereof keep in effect, in responsible companies, liability insurance in the names of and for the benefit of 
Tenant and Landlord with limits as follows: 
Bodily Injury $ 500,000 each person 
$ 500,000 each accident 
Property Damage $ 100,000 
or a "combined single limit" (covering bodily injury liability and property damage) of not less than One 
Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00), Such insurance may, at Tenant's election, be carried under any general 
blanket coverage of Tenant. A renewal policy shall be procured not less than ten (10) days prior to the 
expiration of any policy. A satisfactory certificate of the insurer evidencing insurance carried with proof 
of payment of the premium shall be deposited with Landlord. Tenant shall have the right to settle and 
adjust all liability claims and all claims against the insurance companies, but without subjecting Landlord 
to any liability or obligation. Each such policy shall contain a provision, endorsement, or similar 
agreement by the insurer that it will give Landlord at least ten (10) days written notice before any such 
policy(ies) shall be altered or cancelled. 
19. Surrender of Premises. Tenant agrees to surrender the Premises at the expiration or 
sooner termination of this Lease or any extension thereof, broom-clean in the same condition as when 
said Premises were delivered to Tenant, as altered pursuant to the provisions of this Lease, ordinary 
wear, tear, and damage by fire, the elements, and other casualty excepted. If Tenant elects to remove any 
items of its property from the Premises, it shall repair any damage caused by the removal thereof, which 
shall not include repainting or redecorating. If within twenty (20) days after Tenant vacates the property, 
Tenant fails to remove its personal property and fixtures the same shall be deemed abandoned and shall 
become the property of Landlord. 
20. Holdover, Should Tenant hold over the Premises or any part hereof after the expiration 
of the term of tin's Lease, unless otherwise agreed in writing, such holding over shall constitute an 
unlawful detainer, and Tenant shall be subject to a claim for damages as provided ynder the Utah 
unlawful detainer statutes; provided ,however> if such holdover is pursuant to thfc express written consent 
of Landlord, said holdover shall constitute a tenancy from month-to-month only, and Jenant snail pay as 
monthly rental the then reasonable value of the use and occupation of the Premises which shall not be 
less than the rent to be paid for the last month under this Lease. 
21. Quiet Enjoyment. If and as long as Tenant pays the rents reserved by this Lease and 
perforins and observes ail the covenants and provisions hereof, Tenant shall quietly ciyoy the Premises, 
subject, however, to the terms of this Lease, and Landlord will warrant and defend Tenant in the 
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Ijoyment and peaceful possession of the Premises throughout the term of this Lease and any extensions 
W renewals thereof. 
22. Landlord's Title, Landlord covenants that Landlord has good and marketable title to the 
Premises, subject only to encumbrances described on Exhibit "B," with full right and authority to grant 
die estate demised herein and to execute and perform all of the terms and conditions of this Lease. 
Landlord shall timely and fully perform and comply with each and every term, covenant, and condition 
of each mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien, claim, or encumbrance on the Premises, created or suffered 
to exist by it. 
On the date of this Lease and as of a date no later than the commencement of the original term of 
diis Lease, Landlord covenants that the Premises are subject to no leases or tenancies and the Premises 
are subject to no restrictions, agreements, violations, mortgages, encumbrances, liens, easements, or 
defects in title of any nature whatsoever other than those specifically set forth in Exhibit HB" attached 
hereto and by reference made a part hereof. Landlord further covenants that as of a date no later than the 
commencement of the original term of this Lease, the Premises are subject to no zoning or other 
restrictions which would prohibit the use of the Premises for the operations proposed by Tenant (if not 
prohibited by law and if Tenant obtains all necessary licenses at Tenant's expense). 
23. Waiver of Covenants. It is agreed that the waiving of any of the covenants of this Lease 
by either party shall be limited to the particular instance and shall not be deemed to waive any other 
bleaches of such covenant or any provisions herein contained. 
24. Events of Default. The following shall be "events of default" under this Lease and the 
terms "event of default" or "default" shall mean, whenever they are used in this Lease, any one or more 
of the following events. 
(a) Failure by Tenant to pay or cause to be paid the rent herein required to be paid within a 
period often (10) days after said payment is due. 
(b) Failure by Tenant or Landlord tc/observe)and perform &ny other covenant, condition, or 
agreement on its part to be observed or perrormed for a period of thirty (30) days after written 
notice given to the party at fault by the other party hereto, specifying such failure and requesting 
that it be remedied, unless said covenant, condition, or agreement requires more thnn thirty (30) 
days to observe or perform, in which case the party at fault shall have a reasonable time to observe 
or perform so long as the party at fault shall begin to observe or perform within said thirty (30) 
day period and diligently pursue the observation or performance of the covenant, condition, or 
agreement to its completion. 
25. Remedies of Default. 
(a) Whenever any event ot default by Tenant shall have happened and be 
continuing, subject to the laws of the state of Utah, Landlord may take any one or more 
of the following remedial steps after giving Tenant an additional thirty (30) days written 
notice if the event of default is still then continuing; 
(i) Re-enter and take possession of the Premises without terminating this 
Lease and sublease the Premises for the account of Tenant, holding Tenant liable 
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for the difference in the rent and other amounts payable by the sublessee, 
including ail reasonable costs and expenses of such subleasing and the rents and 
other amounts payable by Tenant hereunder. 
(ii) Terminate the lease term, exclude Tenant from possession of the 
Premises, and use its best efforts to lease the Premises to another party for the 
account of Tenant, holding Tenant liable for all rent and other amounts due 
under this Lease and not paid by such other party as well as all reasonable costs 
and expenses in leasing the Premises to another party. 
(iii) Take whatever action at law or in equity may appear necessary or 
desirable to collect the rent then due and thereafter to become due, or to enforce 
performance and observance of any obligation, agreement, or covenant of 
Tenant under this Lease. 
(iv) Make performance for Tenant and for that purpose, advance such 
amounts as may be necessary. Any amounts so advanced or any expense 
incurred or sum of money paid by reason of the failure to comply with any 
covenant, agreement, obligation, or provisions of this Lease or in defending any 
action by reason of any such failure for any reason shall be deemed to be 
additional rent. The acceptance by Landlord of any installment of fixed rent or 
of any additional rent hereunder shall not be a waiver of any other rent then due. 
(v) Terminate this Lease by giving Tenant notice of such termination and, 
thereupon, this Lease shall expire as fully and completely as ii that day were the 
date definitely fixed for the expiration of the term of this Lease, and Tenant shall 
then quit and surrender the Premises. 
(b) Whenever any event of default by Landlord shall have happened and be 
continuing, Tenant may take any one or more of the following remedial steps after 
giving Landlord an additional thirty (30) days written notice if the event of default is still 
continuing: 
(i) Take whatever action at law or in equity may appear necessary or 
desirable to enforce performance and observance of any obligation, agreement, 
or covenant of Landlord under this Lease. 
(ii) Make performance for Landlord and for that purpose, advance such 
amounts as may be necessary. Any amounts so advanced or any expense 
incurred or sum of money paid by reason of the failure to comply with any 
covenant, agreement, obligation, or provisions of this Lease or in defending any 
action by reason of any such" failure for any reason may be recovered from 
Landlord upon demand and, if necessary, may be offset against the monthly 
rental payable by Tenant in an amount to be mutually determined by Landlord 
and Tenant. 
No remedy herein conferred upon or reserved to Landlord or Tenant is intended to be exclusive 
of any other available remedy or remedies, but each and every such remedy shall be cumulative and shall 
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oc in addition to every other remedy given under this Lease now or hereafter existing at law or in equity 
or by statute. No delay or omission to exercise any right or power accruing upon any default shall impair 
any such right or power or shall be construed to be a waiver thereof, but any such right and power may 
be exercised from time to time and as often as may be deemed expedient. 
26. Involuntary Actions Against Tenant. If the Premises or any part thereof shall be 
abandoned, if Tenant shall be dismissed therefrom by or under any authority other than Landlord, if the 
leasehold estate created hereby shall be taken on execution or by any process of law, or if Tenant shall 
admit in writing its inability to pay its obligations generally as they become due, then Landlord may, at 
its option, terminate this Lease, and Landlord or Landlord's agents and servants may immediately, or at 
any time thereafter, re-enter the Premises by force, summary proceedings, or otherwise, and remove all 
persons and property therein, without being liable to indictment, prosecution, or damage therefor. 
Landlord may in addition to any other remedy provided by law or permitted herein, at its option, relet 
upon reasonable terms and conditions said Premises on behalf of Tenant, applying any moneys collected 
first to Ihe payment of expenses of reassuming or obtaining possession, second to the payment of costs of 
placing the Premises in rentable condition, including leasing commission, and third to the payment of 
rent due hereunder and any other charges due to Landlord, Any surplus remaining thereafter shall be 
paid to Tenant, and Tenant shall remain liable for any deficiency in rental which shall be paid upon 
demand therefor to Landlord. 
27. Enforcement. In the event either party shall enforce the terms of this Lease by suit or 
otherwise, the party at fault shall pay the costs and expenses incident thereto, including reasonable 
attorneys1 fees. 
28. Past Due Sums. If Tenant or Landlord fails to pay, within ten (10) days after the same is 
due and payable, any rent, or other amounts required to be paid hereunder; such unpaid amounts shall 
bear interest from the due date of payment at a variable rate equal to five (5) percentage points over the 
rate published in The Wall Street Journal, as the prime rate, which is the base rate on corporate loans at 
large United States money center commercial banks, as adjusted from time to time while the amount 
remains unpaid, but in no event less than fifteen percent (15%) per annum. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, however, Tenant's or Landlord's right concerning such interest shall be limited by the 
maximum amount which may properly be charged for such purposes under applicable law. 
29. Failure to Perform Covenant. Any failure on the part of either party to this Lease to 
perform any obligation hereunder and any delay in doing any act required hereby shall be excused if such 
failure or delay is caused by any strike, lockout, governmental restriction, or any other similar cause 
beyond the reasonable control of the party so failing to perform, to the extent and for the period that such 
cause continues, save and except that the provisions of this paragraph shall not excuse nonpayment of 
r^nt or other sums due hereunder on its due date. 
30. Rights of Successors and Assigns. The covenants and agreements contained In this 
Lease shall apply to» inure to the benefit of, and be binding upon the parties hereto, their permitted 
assigns and their respective successors in interest. 
31. Time. Time is of the essence of this Lease and every term, covenant, and condition 
herein contained. 
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32. Lkns. Should any mechanic's or other lien be filed against the Premises or any part 
crcof by reason of Tenant's acts or omission or because of a claim against Tenant, Tenant shall cause 
the same to be cancelled and discharged of record by bond or otherwise within ten (10) days after written 
notice by Landlord unless the lien is being contested by Tenant in good faith in which cas8 the above 
time period shall not begin to run until the matter is finally resolved against Tenant. 
33. Laws. Waste, Nuisance. Tenant covenants that it: 
(a) will comply with all governmental laws, ordinances, regulations, and 
requirements, now in force or which hereafter may be in force, of any lawful 
governmental body or authorities having jurisdiction over the Premises; 
(b) will keep the Premises and every part thereof in a clean, neat, and orderly 
condition, free of objectionable noise, odors, or nuisances, and will in ail respects and at 
all times fully comply with all health and police regulations; and 
(c) shall not suffer, permit, or commit any waste. 
34. Construction of Lease. The word "Landlord" as used herein shall refer to the individual, 
individuals, partnership, or corporation called "Landlord" at the commencement of this Lease, and the 
word "Tenant11 shall likewise refer to the individual, individuals, partnership, or corporation called 
"Tenant." Words of any gender used in this Lease shall be held to include any other gender, and words 
in the singular number shall be held in include the plural when the sense requires. 
35. Paragraph Headings. The paragraph headings as to the contents of particular paragraphs 
herein are inserted only for convenience and are in no way to be construed as part of such paragraph or 
as a limitation of the scope of the particular paragraph to which they refer. 
36. No Broker No broker or other person has been instrumental in introducing the parties to 
this Lease or in negotiating any term hereof, except Resort Realty Group which is entitled to a 
commission payable by the Landlord. 
37. Notices. It is agreed that the legal address of the parties for all notices required or 
pcrmilted to be given hereunder, or for ail purposes of billing, process, correspondence, and any other 
legal purposes whatsoever, shall be deemed sufficient, if given by a communication in writing by 
personal service, as defined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or United States mail, postage prepaid 
and certified, return receipt requested, and addressed as follows (or such other address as Landlord or 
Tenant shall specify in writing to the other): 
If to Landlord, to: Utah Coal & Lumber Restaurant, Inc. 
Attn: Nick Powell 
P.O. Box 632323 
Park City, Utah 84068 
If to Tenant, to: Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, Inc. 
dba White Pine Touring 
Attn: Charles Sturgis 
P.O. Box 680393 
-11 
Park City, Utah 84068 
Notice shall be deemed to have been given on the date said notice is received by Landlord or Tenant 
hereunder. 
38. Mortgage by Landlord. Tenant enters into and accepts this Lease and the leasehold 
interest and estate of Tenant hereunder subject and subordinate to any existing or future mortgages* 
deeds of trust, or other transfers of Landlord's interests. Any subordination shall be effective only upon 
receipt of written notice from the Landlord setting forth the date of the mortgage or deed of trust and the 
name of the party holding such mortgage or deed of trust 
39. Sale of Leased Premises. Notwithstanding paragraph 38 above, in the event Landlord 
shall sell (rather than mortgage or encumber) these Premises or the Building to a third party, Landlord 
agrees that any such sale shall be subject to this Lease and Tenant's rights hereunder shall not be deemed 
cancelled or terminated. 
40. First Right of Rgfiisaj. In the event that Landlord is selling die Building apart from the 
property the Building is located on which is being separately developed, then Landlord hereby grants 
Tenant a right of first refusal to purchase the Building as follows: 
(a) Prior to completing a sale to bonafide third party, Landlord shall notify Tenant 
of its intention to sell and the proposed price and terms of such sale in its entirety deleting the 
name of the proposed purchaser. Upon receipt of such notice, Tenant shall have a period of 
thirty (30) days in which to notify Landlord in writing that it wishes to purchase the Building at 
the proposed price and terms and in connection therewith delivering such cash, down payments 
and mortgages and such other terms of payment, including closing dates, as are set forth in the 
written notice. 
(b) In the event that Tenant fails to notify Landlord of its wish to exercise its first 
right of refusal and complete such purchase, Landlord may then sell the Building to such third 
parly as it deems appropriate. 
(c) In the event the Tenant fails to purchase the Building any one time pursuant to 
this first right of refusal, whether by failure to elect or complete such a purchase and the 
Landlord completes its sale to a 'hird party, this first right of refusal shall terminate and Tenant 
shall be entitled to negotiate its own arrangements with the new owner. 
(d) In the event the Tenant fails to complete a purchase of the Building pursuant to 
tiiis first right of refusal, but Landlord fails to complete its sale to a bonafide third party> then 
Tenant shall retain its right of first refusal on subsequent sales by the Landlord. 
(e) Sales of corporate stock of the Landlord shall not be deemed to be a sale of the 
Building or Premises and shall not be subject to the provisions of this paragraph. 
41. Entire Agreement This Lease is and shall be considered to be^ the only agreement or 
understanding between die parties hereto. All negotiations and oral agreements acceptable to both 
parties havo been incorporated herein. This Lease may not be amended or modified by any act or 
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induct of the parties or by oral agreement, unless reduced to writing and signed by the party to be 
charged therewith. If any provision of this Lease is declared invalid in a court proceeding between the 
parties hereto, such invalidity shall not invalidate this Lease, and this Lease shall be construed as if the 
Invalid part were not contained herein, and the rights and obligations of the parties shall be construed and 
enforced accordingly. 
42. Possession. Landlord shall deliver to Tenant possession of the Premises 
contemporaneously with the execution hereof 
43. No Partnership. Landlord does not by this Lease, in any way or for any purpose, become 
a partner or joint venturer of Tenant in the conduct of its business or otherwise. 
44. Landlord's Right for Future Development. Landlord expressly reserves the right to 
develop the surrounding or adjacent premises in any manner which it deems appropriate and Tenant 
waives any right it may have for any compensation or off-set by reason of such development Tenant 
acknowledges that Landlord has plans to further develop property held by Landlord that is contiguous to 
the Premises and in so doing may alter, modify, or add to the Building and construct other improvements 
on land adjoining the Building provided that, delivery access to either the north or east side of the 
Building shall be preserved in any future development Such construction shall be conducted by 
Landlord, to the extent reasonably practicable, to minimize interference with Tenant's use of the 
Premises, including reasonable notice as to the schedule of all construction, but Tenant acknowledges 
that such construction may interfere with such use and hereby waives any right to offset or decrease the 
rent due to Landlord under the terms of this Lease as a result of any such interference. 
45. Provisions Binding. Etc. Except as otherwise provided, all provisions herein shall be 
binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties, their legal representatives, heirs, successors, 
and assigns. Each provision to be performed by either party shall be construed to be both a covenant and 
a condition. 
46. Environmental Hazards and Indemnifications Landlord acknowledges that it has not 
received notice that there are any hazardous toxic wastes or hazardous substances, hereinafter 
collectively referred to as "Environmental Materials'1, present or stored on the Premises or adjacent 
parcel, except that Landlord is aware that there is an old buried gas tank on the adjacent property which 
has to date not caused any problem with Environmental Materials. Landlord agrees that it shall be 
responsible for any clean-up required by reason of Environmental Materials found on the Premises in its 
current state and shall further be responsible for any problems created by Environmental Materials in 
Landlord's future development of adjacent Premises. Landlord shall hold Tenant harmless and 
indemnify Tenant from any damage, cost, or injury which may be occasioned by such Environmental 
Materials, except those occasioned by Tenant's use of the Premises* Tenant hereby covenants that it will 
use the Premises in a manner which will not create any problem with Environmental Materials, including 
but not limited to transportation, storage or disposal, and Tenant shall indemnify Landlord from any 
damage, cost, or injury which may be occasioned by such Environmental Materials, except those 
occasioned by Landlord's use of the Premises. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused these presents to be executed as of die 
date first above written. 
Landlord: 





OUTDOOR ENDEAVORS UNLIMITED, INC. 
dba White Pine Touring 
By, 
Duly Authorized Officer 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
The sole encubrance on the property is a commercial loan (line of credit for 
$45,000.00) with 2I0NS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, P O. BOX 26304, Salt Lake City, 
UT84126-0304. This loan is secured by a Deed of Trust. 
The current balance of this Loan is approximately $6,500.00. 
APPENDIX B 
FILED DISTDICT COUDT 
Third Judicial District 
AUG & § mB 
BMJLM&HQUNVf 
Deputy Oterfc 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COAL AND LUMBER 
RESTAURANT, INC. 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant, 
vs. 
OUTDOOR ENDEAVORS UNLIMITED, 
INC., d/b/a WHITE PENE TOURING, 
Defendant and Counterclaimant 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 980600256 
Honorable William A. Thome 
The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant Utah 
Coal and Lumber Restaurant, Inc. ("UC&L"), and the Cross-Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment filed by Defendant and Counterclaimant Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, Inc. d/b/a 
White Pine Touring ("White Pine") came before the Court for hearing on July 26, 1999. UC&L 
was represented by Bart J. Johnsen. White Pine was represented by Alan L. Sullivan. 
The Court, having reviewed the cross motions, the memoranda and affidavits in support of 
and in opposition to the cross motions, and having considered the arguments of counsel, and good 
cause appearing, concludes that there are no disputed issues of fact material to the relief requested 
SHAUGHTOLC\09770L01 
n n 'X n 
by White Pine, that White Pine is entitled to judgment as requested in its motion, that UC&L's 
motion should be denied, and that White Pine's motion should be granted. The Court further 
concludes as a matter of law: 
1. Under Utah law, strict compliance is the general rule for interpretation of an option 
to extend the terms of a lease agreement. 
2. The doctrine of equitable excuse is available under Utah law as an exception to the 
general rule requiring strict compliance. 
3. A mere mistake or forgetfulness on the part of a lessee is insufficient, by itself, to 
satisfy the requirements of the doctrine of equitable excuse. 
4. A landlord is not responsible for the forgetfulness of a tenant. 
5. White Pine's failure to timely exercise its option to extend the primary term of the 
lease was an honest and justifiable mistake. 
6. An honest and justifiable mistake, as referenced in the Utah case law on the 
subject, is defined in contrast to a mistake resulting from wilful conduct or gross negligence. 
7. White Pine's failure to timely exercise its option to extend was not the result of 
wilful conduct or gross negligence. 
8. In the context of the distractions faced by the principals of White Pine during the 
relevant time period, the Court concludes that White Pine's mistake in failing to timely exercise 
the option to extend was honest and justifiable. 
9. Although the 30-day default clause in the parties' Lease Agreement (May 16, 
1993) is not legally sufficient to excuse White Pine's failure to timely exercise the option to 
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extend, it does provide context for White Pine's conduct and supports the conclusion that White 
Pine's mistake was honest. 
10. White Pine's 11-day delay in exercising its option to extend was short. 
11. UC&L did not suffer any harm or prejudice as a result of White Pine's delay. 
UC&L did not change its position in reliance on White Pine's delay. UC&L did not attempt to 
sell or lease the premises to another tenant. Because UC&L did not change its position in any 
way, UC&L would not suffer any loss if the Court equitably excuses White Pine's delay. 
12. White Pine would suffer substantial and irreparable harm if its delay in exercising 
the option to extend were not equitably excused. 
13. White Pine invested a substantial amount of money for permanent improvements in 
the premises with the expectation that it would remain in the premises for the full 20 year 
extended term of the Lease Agreement. The loss of White Pine's monetary investment, its 
expectation that it would remain at that location for 20 years, and the loss of good will associated 
with operating its business at that location all factor into the harm that White Pine would suffer if 
its delay in exercising the option to extend is not equitably excused. 
14. Based upon the undisputed facts of this case, White Pine has met the requirements 
necessary to invoke the doctrine of equitable excuse. 
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED 
AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed by UC&L is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice and on the merits. 
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2. Partial summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of White Pine for the relief 
sought in the First Cause of Action contained in its counterclaim and the Second Affirmative 
Defense contained in its answer. 
3. White Pine is equitably excused from strictly complying with the terms of the 
parties' Lease Agreement relating to extension of the primary term of the lease. 
4. The Court declares that White Pine has exercised its right to extend the terms of 
the parties' Lease Agreement and is entitled to possession, use, and quiet enjoyment of the 
premises for an extended term of five years beginning September 9, 1998, subject to the rental 
and other terms of the parties' Lease Agreement. 
5. White Pine has posted a cash counter-possession bond with the Clerk of the Court 
in the amount of $60,000 plus interest pursuant to this Court's order dated October 4, 1998. The 
Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to release the counter-possession bond with interest as 
follows: 
(a) The Clerk shall issue a check, payable to Utah Coal and Lumber 
Restaurant, Inc. and its attorneys, Richman & Richman, in the amount of $55,844.18, 
representing all of the amounts due to UC&L under the Lease Agreement for the period 
from September 1, 1998 through July 31, 1999. 
(b) The Clerk shall issue a check, payable to White Pine Touring, for the 
balance of the amount held by the Clerk for the counter-possession bond. 
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6. UC&L has posted a possession bond with the Clerk of the Court pursuant to this 
Court's order dated October 4, 1998. The Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to release the 
possession bond. 
7. The Court reserves the issue of entitlement to attorneys' fees and costs. 
DATED this &_ day of / ^ ( u ^ , , 1999. 
^ BY THE COURT 
VED AS TO FORM: 
1 r Utah Coal and Lumber Restaurant, Inc. 
SHAUGHT\SLC\097701.01 5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
,4-. 'V*^ 
I hereby certify that on the [£_ day of-fcly, 1999,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing [PROPOSED] PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served, via United States 
mail, postage prepaid, on the following: 
Bart J. Johnsen 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN 
60 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
,QaJ§A-
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HOWE, Chief Justice: 
Defendant Mary Doughty appeals from a judgment 
entered against her and in favor of plaintiff William H. 
Geisdorf stemming from a dispute over a lease 
agreement between the parties. Doughty contends the 
trial court erroneously stated the law in the jury 
instructions. She seeks (1) reversal of the judgment 
entered below on the jury verdict and (2) a new trial to 
address her counterclaim. Geisdorf cross-appeals, 
seeking a remand to the trial court for clarification and 
resolution of his claim against Doughty for an alleged 
breach of contract. 
BACKGROUND 
In August of 1992, William [**2] Geisdorf and 
Mary Doughty negotiated for the sale of her jewelry 
business, known as "The Family Jewels," and for the 
lease of a portion of her building located at 591 Main 
Street in Park City, Utah, where Geisdorf intended to 
continue to operate that business. Both the Purchase 
Agreement and the Lease Agreement between the parties 
took effect on September 1, 1992. 
The Lease Agreement provided for a basic term of 
three years, to expire on August 31, 1995, and for two 
options to renew for two additional terms of five years 
each. This "Options of Renewal" clause [hereafter "the 
Renewal Clause"] is the source of the parties' 
disagreement. The Renewal Clause reads, in pertinent 
part: 
Lessee shall have two options to renew this lease for 
a period of five additional years each. Written notice of 
intention to renew must be furnished Lessor at least four 
(4) months prior to expiration of the lease or any renewal 
hereunder and this lease must not then be in default or 
have been routinely in default during the prior term. 
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For the majority of the basic term, the parties had a 
good, cordial business relationship. Difficulties were 
minor and generally were handled through ''informal" 
meetings. [**3] In January 1995, Doughty visited 
Geisdorf in one of these "informal" meetings and offered 
him a tentative payment plan for the coming year. This 
plan included a rent payment schedule for those 
payments that would come due if Geisdorf chose to 
renew the lease. The April 30 deadline for exercising the 
option passed; Doughty received no written notice of 
Geisdorf s intention to renew. Sometime in early July, 
Doughty met with the manager of The Family Jewels to 
discuss plans to paint the building at the end of July, 
including a proposal that Geisdorf would be responsible 
for paying a portion of the painting costs. Soon thereafter 
the tenor of the parties' business relationship changed. 
On July 15, 1995, Doughty, having not received the 
written notice required by the Lease Agreement 
concerning exercise of the option, sent a letter to 
Geisdorf. This letter read: 
It has been brought to my attention that we have not 
received notice of your intentions regarding renewal of 
the rental space located at 591 Main Street. The terms of 
the present lease will expire on August 31, 1995. Your 
option to renew the present lease has expired (Section 14 
[of the Lease Agreement]). If you wish to remain [**4] 
in the space we will need to renegotiate as soon as 
possible. 
Doughty made a handwritten note at the bottom of the 
letter requesting a prompt response. Geisdorf answered 
with a letter dated July 24, 1995, which read in pertinent 
part, "This is in response to your letter regarding renewal 
of the lease on 'The Family Jewels.' ... Please use this as 
a confirmation of my verbal intention to renew the lease 
as per the original agreement." 
As the time for exercising the option had elapsed 
nearly two months earlier, Doughty initiated negotiations 
with Geisdorf for a new lease. These negotiations soon 
proved fruitless as Geisdorf steadfastly maintained his 
right as lessee to remain in the building. In August 1995, 
Geisdorf filed this action claiming that "under the 
circumstances, he had exercised his option to renew the 
lease" and [*69] was therefore legally entitled to remain 
on the premises as lessee under the first five-year 
renewal term. 
Doughty responded by serving Geisdorf with a 
notice to quit as provided for in section 17 of the Lease 
Agreement, which reads in pertinent part: 
HOLDING OVER: If Lessee holds possession of the 
premises after the term of this lease, Lessee shall [**5] 
become a tenant from month-to-month on the terms 
herein specified ... and Lessee shall continue to be a 
month-to-month tenant until the tenancy shall be 
terminated by Lessor, or until Lessee has given to Lessor 
a written notice ... of his intention to terminate the 
tenancy. 
(Emphasis added.) Doughty also closed the bank account 
to which Geisdorf had been making rent payments. 
Geisdorf remained obdurate in the face of the notice 
to quit and subsequent proceedings to evict him from the 
premises. In October, November, and December of 
1995, he deposited rent payments to Doughty's closed 
bank account, which the bank mistakenly accepted but 
later returned to Geisdorf. Two of the deposits were 
returned along with a letter dated December 5, 
1995, explaining, in part, that the deposits had been 
"erroneously accepted" for an account "closed by the 
customer on September 28, 1995" and requesting that no 
further deposits be made. 
In February 1996, Geisdorf complained of a water 
leak in the ceiling of the store that had damaged ceiling 
tiles, walls, and merchandise. Geisdorf requested that 
Doughty take care of it based on section 7 of the Lease 
Agreement that stipulated: "Lessor [**6] shall be 
responsible for all structural repairs and repairs or 
replacement of the roof." Doughty had the ice build-up 
removed from the roof, but would not repair any interior 
damage, since "[she] didn't feel it was her responsibility 
... because Mr. Geisdorf had already been served with a 
notice of eviction, and he was [remaining] there 
unlawfully." 
In April of 1996, Doughty filed a counterclaim 
against Geisdorf for unlawful detainer. The case went to 
trial and a jury returned findings in favor of Geisdorf. In 
harmony with the jury's findings, the court adjudged that 
Geisdorf was to "remain in the leased premises during 
the first option period, September 1, 1995, through 
August 31, 2000, pursuant to the Lease Agreement." 
Additionally, pursuant to the jury's finding that Doughty 
had breached the Lease Agreement, the court awarded 
Geisdorf $ 2,905 in damages. Doughty now appeals and 
requests that we reverse the trial court's judgment for 
Geisdorf and remand this case for further proceedings to 
grant her relief on her counterclaim. She contends that 
the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that 
"substantial compliance" with the renewal option is 
sufficient to constitute [**7] an exercise thereof. 
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Furthermore, she maintains that at no time did her 
conduct meet the requirements necessary for waiver and 
that the jury's finding of waiver by her was not supported 
by the evidence. Geisdorf cross-appeals, contending that 
the trial court did not adequately address an alleged 
breach of the Lease Agreement. At trial, Geisdorf 
requested that the court require the jury to specifically 
determine whether Doughty's "failure to replace the 
north facing building sign [was] a breach of the 
agreement." The court declined, electing instead to ask 
the jury whether "Doughty breached any term of the 
lease agreement" and "what damage, if any, was caused 
by such breach." He now asserts error in the trial court's 
instructions, claiming ambiguity regarding his asserted 
breach and the damages arising therefrom. He requests a 
remand for clarification on this issue. 
DISCUSSION 
The court instructed the jury, in part, to decide 
whether (1) "Geisdorf substantially complied with the 
lease's notice of renewal provision"; (2) "Doughty 
distinctly manifested an intent to waive her right to 
receive written notice"; and (3) "Geisdorf relied upon 
any distinct waiver ... when he failed [**8] to give 
written notice of his exercise of his option." The jury 
found for Geisdorf in each instance. The issue of 
whether substantial compliance with the renewal clause 
is sufficient to constitute an exercise thereof is a question 
of law which this court reviews for [*70] correctness, 
see United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City 
Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993), and to which this 
court gives no deference. See Zoll & Branch, P.C v. 
Asay, 932 P.2d 592, 593 (Utah 1997); State v. Anderson, 
929P.2d 1107, 1108 (Utah 1996). The issue of waiver is 
a question of fact; when examining jury verdicts such as 
these, "we 'review the evidence and all inferences which 
may be reasonably drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict,'" State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 
459 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 
232, 236 (Utah 1992)), and reverse the lower court only 
when "we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to 
support the verdict." Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 
886 P.2d 48, 52 (Utah 1994). 
I. SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE 
The initial question we address is one of 
"substantial" compliance versus "strict" compliance. 
Specifically, we must decide [**9] whether it was error 
for the trial court to instruct the jury that Geisdorf was 
only required to substantially comply with the Renewal 
Clause. We look first to the pertinent language of that 
clause which provides: "Lessee shall have two options to 
renew this lease for a period of five additional years 
each. Written notice of intention to renew must be 
furnished Lessor at least four (4) months prior to 
expiration of the lease ...." (Emphasis added.) 
This court has previously held that "'when the 
optionee decides to exercise his option he must act 
unconditionally and precisely according to the terms of 
the option.'" Upland Indus. Corp. v. Pacific Gamble 
Robinson Co., 684 P2d 638, 640 (Utah 1984) (quoting 
Williston on Contracts § 61D (3d ed. 1957)). Actual 
exercise of the option must be "in accordance with its 
terms." J.R. Stone Co. v. Keate, 576 P.2d 1285, 1288 
(Utah 1978); see also Nance v. Schoonover, 521 P.2d 
896, 897 (Utah 1974); Equitable Realty, Inc. v. Nielson, 
30 Utah 2d 433, 435, 519 P.2d 243, 244 (1974) (stating 
that an option, once granted, "must be exercised strictly 
according to its terms"), nl 
nl A decision by the Utah Court of Appeals, 
while not binding on this court, also supports the 
general rule that "option agreements become 
bilateral contracts ... only upon exercise of the 
option in accordance with its terms." Mills v. 
Brody, 929 P.2d 360, 364 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 
1996); see also Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
("When an offer specifies the manner in which it 
must be accepted, it can only be accepted in the 
specified manner. Otherwise mutual assent is 
lacking, and no contract is formed."). 
[**10] 
Courts across the country also follow this rule of 
law. The exercise of an option requires the affirmative 
performance of an option according to its specific terms. 
See Loose v. Brubacher, 219 Kan. 727, 549 P.2d 991, 
996 (Kan. 1976); Northcutt v. McPherson, 81 KM. 743, 
473 P.2d 357, 359 (N.M. 1970); State ex rel Carriger v. 
Campbell Food Markets, Inc., 65 Wash. 2d 600, 398 
P.2d 1016, 1021-22 (Wash. 1965). An optionee is to be 
held to strict, exact compliance with the provisions and 
restrictions of an option. Richardson v. Casey, 6 Ariz. 
App. 141, 430 P.2d 720, 722 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967); 
Rosenthal v. Sandusky, 35 Colo. App. 220, 533 P.2d 523, 
526 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Covey v. Covey's Little 
America, Inc., 378 P.2d 506, 513 (Wyo. 1963). Such 
strict compliance is necessary before the option becomes 
"absolute and binding," Anderson v. Overland Park 
Credit Union, 231 Kan. 97, 643 P.2d 120, 125 (Kan. 
1982), "a bilateral contract," Maloffv. B-Neva, Inc., 85 
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Nev. 471, 456 P.2d 438, 439 (Nev. 1969), and "an 
executory contract." CilJessen v. Kona Co., 73 N.M. 297, 
387P.2d867, 870 (N.M. 1964). 
Furthermore, "the doctrine of substantial 
performance f**l 1] cannot be used to avoid mandatory 
[option] provisions." Stratman v. Dietrich, 765 P.2d 603, 
605 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988). As one court has correctly 
stated: 
The rule of substantial compliance with the terms of 
the contract which is applicable to bilateral contracts 
whereby both parties are already bound is not applicable 
to the exercise of an option, which ... is a continuing 
offer to make a bilateral contract [and] must be accepted 
precisely according to the terms of the offer. 
Jones v. Horner, 36 Tenn. App. 657, 260 S.W.2d 198, 
199 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). In other words, although substantial 
compliance is sufficient for bilateral [*71] contracts, 
performance of an option requires strict compliance. 
Strict compliance is not arcane ritualism at work, or as 
Geisdorf suggests, "hocus-pocus." On the contrary, there 
is no "unnecessarily mysterious or elaborate activity or 
talk to cover up a deception" n2 which Geisdorf seems to 
imply. Insisting upon parties' compliance with 
contractual language may seem to some to be rigorously 
punctilious. However, this is not necessarily the case. 
n2 Webster's New Universal Unabridged 
Dictionary 909 (1996). 
[**12] 
Indeed, there are instances in which deviation from 
strict compliance may be equitably excused. See Nielson 
v. Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah 1982) (holding 
that strict compliance is excused when substantial 
compliance is offered to and accepted by optionor under 
"exigent circumstances beyond [the parties'] control"). 
Some instances in which an optionee may be excused 
from strict compliance include when the optionee's 
"conduct in failing to comply was not due to willful or 
gross negligence on the part of the optionee but was 
rather the result of an honest and justifiable mistake," 
Cattle Feeders, Inc. v. Jordan, 549 S. W.2d 29, 33 (Tex. 
App. 1977), and in cases "where the strict compliance 
was prevented by some act of the optionor such as 
waiver or misleading representations or conduct." Id. 
Barring such instances, however, it is as much incumbent 
upon an optionee to comply with the terms of his option 
as upon a direct contractee in an agreement of sale to 
comply with the terms of his agreement. Accordingly, 
where parties enter into a contract by the terms of which 
one of them binds himself to perform at the option of the 
other, upon being given written notice, [**13] the party 
having such option must exercise it in the manner 
provided by the contract. 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 
73 (1991) (emphasis added). In the absence of some such 
supervening, excusing instance, this court has no choice 
but to require strict compliance with the terms of the 
Lease Agreement This being so, unless Doughty waived 
her right to receive written notice, we must require strict 
compliance with the Renewal Clause. 
II. WAIVER 
We turn now to the question of waiver. As has 
already been noted, it is generally held that a lessor may 
waive strict compliance with option provisions. See 
Cattle Feeders, Inc., 549 S. W.2d at 33 ("Equity will also 
excuse strict compliance where ... prevented by ... waiver 
...."); see also Fun Prod. Distrib., Inc. v. Martens, 559 
P.2d 1054, 1058 (Alaska 1977) (stating that an option 
provision requiring written notice is for the lessor's 
benefit and may be waived) (citing Gruber v. 
Castleberry, 23 Ariz. App. 322, 533 P.2d 82, 84 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1975)); Fleming Companies, Inc. v. Equitable 
Life Ins. Co. of Iowa, 16 Kan. App. 2d 77, 818P.2d8l3, 
822 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (holding strict compliance with 
a "time for renewal" [**14] option provision waivable). 
This court in Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings 
& Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993), clarified the 
legal standard necessary to find waiver. Until that time, 
the case law pertaining to waiver was ambiguous and 
confusing, sometimes incorrectly stating the law. This 
"understandably leads to ... erroneous instructions and 
interrogatories given by the state court," id. at 938, 
especially where the question of intentional 
relinquishment was at issue. In Soter's, this court 
addressed that confusion, tightening the accepted 
definition of waiver. 
Because [intentional relinquishment] is intensely 
fact dependent, evolution of the general issue by Utah's 
appellate courts, when combined with our tendency to 
want to generalize rules from our decisions, has 
produced the increasingly confusing statements of what 
is needed to show intent, resulting in the present 
confusion in the law. The way out of the present 
confusion is to recognize that each set of facts or new 
case does not call for a new, more particularized 
statement of the intentional relinquishment element and 
the facts needed to prove it. Rather, we retreat to a 
general statement of [**15] the law that can be applied 
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to divergent fact situations by finders of fact without 
undue appellate attempts at before-the-fact [*72] 
control over the resulting determinations. 
Id. at 940. This "general statement" established a test by 
which a fact finder could determine waiver: "A waiver is 
the intentional relinquishment of a known right. To 
constitute waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit 
or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an 
intention to relinquish it." Id. at 942 (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Phoenix Inc. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 194, 61 
P.2d 308, 311-2 (1936)). This court further stated that "a 
fact finder should assess the totality of the circumstances 
to determine whether the relinquishment is clearly 
intended." 857 P.2d at 941 (citations omitted). Finally, 
"any waiver 'must be distinctly made, although it may be 
express or implied.'" Id. at 940. 
Soter's rejected previous "attempts to spin out 
further fact-dependent rules about proof of the 
intentional relinquishment element [of waiver]." Id. at 
942. However, we now find it necessary to clarify the 
Soter's definition of waiver as it applies in this case. This 
should not signal [**16] the court's desire to return to 
the narrow, ambiguous, fact-dependent definitions of 
Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983), and Rees v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069 (Utah 
1991). Instead, this is a necessary clarification of the 
definition as it relates to options and option 
performances, so that questions such as those before us 
today may be correctly addressed by trial courts. 
Since the performance of options requires a stricter 
standard than performance of bilateral contracts, n3 it 
logically follows that a stricter standard is necessary for 
the waiver of option requirements than that which is 
required for waiver of bilateral contract provisions. In 
Soter's, this court held "that there is only one legal 
standard required to establish waiver under Utah law." 
Soter's, 857 P.2d at 942. Our position has not changed; 
we need not and do not go so far as to establish a 
separate and more rigorous "clear and convincing" 
standard with which to deal with option issues. Instead, 
we urge trial courts to be especially careful in their 
examination of the evidence in questions of waiver and 
option performances, especially where such waiver is 
merely implied. [**17] Further, courts should be 
cautious in finding implied waiver on the part of an 
optionor unless the totality of the circumstances 
demonstrates an unambiguous n4 intent to waive the 
strict compliance required to exercise an option. 
n3 Jones, 260 S. W.2d at 199. 
n4 This term should not signal a deviation 
from the distinct intent set forth in Soter's. We 
see the term "ambiguous" as synonymous with 
"indistinct," see Black's Law Dictionary 79-80 
(6th ed. 1990); see also Webster's New Universal 
Unabridged Dictionary 64 (1996), and will use 
the terms interchangeably. 
In the case at hand, Geisdorf does not argue that 
there was an express waiver of Doughty's right to receive 
written notice of Geisdorf s intent to exercise the option 
to renew. In fact, Geisdorf testified that there was no 
express waiver. Instead, he maintains that (1) after 
signing the Lease Agreement, Doughty never requested 
"that the exercise of the option be in writing" and (2) 
"the jury reasonably could have inferred from Doughty's 
[**18] conduct and the surrounding circumstances" that 
Doughty "more likely than not" intended to relinquish 
her right to receive written notice. 
A. Implied Waiver 
"Although the necessary intent may be clear or 
distinct when there is an express waiver, such intent may 
be more difficult to prove when waiver is to be implied 
from conduct or silence." Soter's, 857 P.2d at 940. 
1. Waiver implied from silence 
'"Mere silence is not a waiver unless there is some duty 
or obligation to speak/" Id. (quoting Plateau Mining Co. 
v. Division of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 730 
(Utah 1990)) (other citation omitted). It is generally 
accepted that a duty to speak will not be found where the 
contracting parties '"deal at arm's length, and where the 
underlying facts are reasonably within the knowledge of 
both parties. Under such circumstances, the plaintiff is 
obliged to take reasonable steps to inform himself, and to 
[*73] protect his own interests."' Copper State Leasing 
Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture Co., 770 P.2d 88, 
93 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added) (quoting Sugar house 
Fin. Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 
1980)). See generally 37 CJ.S. [**19] Fraud § 20 
(1997). 
Geisdorf attempts to make much of the fact that 
Doughty did not request a written notice of intent to 
renew before July 15, 1995. However, both parties, as 
signatories, had copies of the Lease Agreement to which 
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they could refer; the requirement of written notice was 
thus "reasonably within the knowledge of both parties." 
Id. Doughty had no duty to remind Geisdorf of the 
necessity to exercise the option by written notice. 
Geisdorf was responsible to keep himself informed about 
the continuing provisions under the Lease Agreement 
and to protect his interests, both current and future, in the 
leased property. Geisdorf admitted that he did not do 
this. First, Geisdorf testified he had "forgotten" that the 
exercise of the option needed to be in writing. He then 
testified repeatedly that he "never even considered 
[exercising the option in writing]." Thus, having had 
ready access to a copy of the Lease Agreement, Geisdorf 
did not inform himself of, and subsequently protect, his 
interests under the Lease Agreement. 
Furthermore, this court has held that one party to an 
agreement does not have a duty to ensure that the other 
party has a complete and accurate [**20] understanding 
of all terms embodied in a written contract. Rather, each 
party has the burden to read and understand the terms of 
a contract before he or she affixes his or her signature to 
it. A party may not sign a contract and thereafter assert 
ignorance or failure to read the contract as a defense. 
John Call Eng'g, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 
1205, 1208 (Utah 1987) (citing Resource Management 
Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 
1047 (Utah 1985)) (other citation omitted). Since 
Geisdorf was obliged to "inform himself," Copper State 
Leasing Co., 770 P.2d at 93, and had the "burden to 
understand the terms of the contract," Resource 
Management Co., 706 P.2d at 1047, Doughty did not 
have the legal duty to speak for which Geisdorf argues. 
Doughty's alleged implied waiver could then only be 
found from an examination of Doughty's conduct under 
a "totality of the circumstances" standard. 
2. Waiver implied from conduct 
Geisdorf points to seven specific events that he contends 
imply, under the totality of the circumstances, Doughty's 
intent to waive strict compliance with the written notice 
provision. n5 His argument about most of these [**21] 
events relies, however, on the premise that Doughty 
knew or believed that Geisdorf would exercise his option 
to renew. The remaining events are meetings or 
circumstances from which no distinct intent to waive the 
written notice requirement could reasonably be drawn. 
the cause of so much confusion in the courts, we 
address the individual facts of the instant case for 
review of sufficiency only. These specific facts 
should not be considered as "general principles ... 
required to show intentional relinquishment in 
particular cases." Soter's, 857 P.2d at 941. 
After careful consideration of these events, both 
individually and as a totality, we are led to conclude that 
they do not support the jury's finding of Doughty's intent 
to waive the written notice requirement of the Renewal 
Clause. None of the events show distinct intent, nor can 
we accept the supposition that these events, individually 
manifesting indistinct intent, [**22] can suddenly and 
reasonably evince unambiguous intent when taken as a 
whole. n6 
n6 There may be instances in which a 
number of ambiguous events, statements, or 
examples of conduct may show, in the totality of 
the circumstances, a distinct intent. We do not 
wish to create fact-dependent rules concerning 
intentional relinquishment; as application of this 
rule is inherently fact-dependent, we do not have 
occasion today to address this issue. 
Geisdorf s belief of what Doughty knew or should 
have known does not distinctly indicate whether she 
intended to waive written notice. Similarly, Doughty's 
assumed knowledge of Geisdorf s intent to exercise the 
option does not work a waiver of the requirement. This 
court has held that "[a] mere intention to make a request 
[for a new lease] was not sufficient," I.X.L. Furniture 
[*74] & Carpet Installment House v. Berets, 32 Utah 
454, 468, 91 P. 279, 283 (1907), and a lessor's 
knowledge of that intent is not a sufficient basis for 
relief. Id. Furthermore, neither the discussion [**23] 
about the future payment schedule nor the consultation 
about painting the building provides distinct inferences 
to support an intent to waive written notice; myriad 
possible conclusions can be drawn from either instance. 
Finally, the argument that the landlord-tenant 
relationship between these two individuals was cordial 
and informal is irrelevant. Geisdorf provides no 
explanation, nor does this court find an explanation as to 
how this friendly business relationship translates into an 
implied waiver of the contractual requirements to which 
both signatory parties agreed. 
n5 In an effort to avoid the "fact-
dependency" of Hunter and Rees, which has been CONCLUSION 
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We uphold the rule of law that barring special 
circumstances such as misrepresentation or waiver, 
exercise of an option must be made strictly in accordance 
with its terms. The lower court erred in instructing the 
jury that substantial compliance with the terms of the 
option was all that the law required. Absent waiver, 
Geisdorf was required to strictly comply with the written 
notice requirement, which he did not do. Finding waiver 
of an option requires meeting a stricter standard than 
does finding waiver under other circumstances. Since the 
evidence here is "insufficient to support the verdict," 
Scudder, [**24] 886 P.2d at 52, we hold the jury's 
finding of waiver to be in error. 
On cross-appeal, Geisdorf seeks remand of this case for a 
determination that Doughty's failure to replace the 
business' sign was a breach of the Lease Agreement and 
seeks an order to replace either the business' sign or an 
equivalent sign on the building. We reject Geisdorf s 
requests on the following grounds: First, the jury's 
general finding that Doughty had breached the Lease 
Agreement was sufficient to address Geisdorf s concerns 
in that regard, and damages were awarded accordingly. 
Second, since we have held that Geisdorf had not 
appropriately exercised the option to renew the lease, the 
Lease Agreement is no longer in effect, thus making 
specific performance impossible. 
Therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment of 
breach and corresponding damages. However, for 
reasons explained above, we reverse the remainder of the 
trial court's judgment and remand for trial on Doughty's 
counterclaim. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
Associate Chief Justice Durham, Justice 
Zimmerman, and Justice Russon concur in Chief Justice 
Howe's opinion. 
Justice Stewart does not participate herein. 
